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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 
 In this action, brought under the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), Pub. L. 91-452, Title IX, 
84 Stat. 941, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, we are 
presented with the question whether defendants' acts, as alleged, 
constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity."  Specifically, 
we must determine what showing is required for plaintiffs to meet 
the "continuity" prong of RICO's "pattern" requirement.  Because 
we find that plaintiffs have alleged a series of acts sufficient 
to satisfy RICO's continuity requirement, we will reverse the 
  
district court's grant of summary judgment and remand this case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.     
 
 
 The plaintiffs are four of the executors of the Estate 
of Charles Tabas ("the Estate"):  Charles's widow, Harriette 
Tabas; Richard Tabas and Nancy Tabas, two of Charles and 
Harriette's children; and Gerald Levinson, one of Charles's 
business associates.1  In addition to Daniel Tabas, who is 
President and Chief Executive Officer of Tabas Enterprises, the 
named defendants include Joseph Campbell, the Executive Vice 
President of Tabas Enterprises; James McSwiggan, the Comptroller 
of Tabas Enterprises; Daniel's children; and one of Daniel's 
sons-in-law. 
 I. 
 A. 
 In 1964, brothers Charles and Daniel Tabas formed a 
partnership, Tabas Enterprises, to conduct real estate and other 
business ventures.  The partnership agreement governing the 
brothers' joint property holdings required that, in the event of 
the death of either partner, the surviving partner would 
distribute partnership income equally to himself and to the 
estate of the deceased partner, regardless of any personal 
                     
 
   1There are six heirs to the Estate, including the Charles L. 
Tabas Foundation. 
  
services either brother might render.  See Appendix ("App.") at 
62 (Partnership Agreement ¶ 3).  The partnership agreement also 
provided that: 
 
It is the intent of the parties that the survivor of 
them shall be free to exercise his judgment for the 
joint benefit of ownership . . . provided always, that 
the responsibility and obligation of the survivor to 
the estate of the deceased shall be that required of a 
fiduciary. 
App. at 62 (Partnership Agreement ¶ 4(b)). 
 In 1983, Charles Tabas died.  Soon after Charles's 
death, John Van Der Wal, a financial advisor to Daniel and to 
Tabas Enterprises, was asked by Daniel to recommend a reasonable 
financial arrangement between Daniel and Charles's widow, 
Harriette.  In response, Van Der Wal sent a letter to Harriette 
in which he recommended that Daniel receive a $180,000 annual 
management fee from Tabas Enterprises, prior to profit sharing by 
the partners.  Van Der Wal further recommended that Harriette and 
Daniel each receive a $10,000 monthly draw check from Tabas 
Enterprises.2     
 Beginning in March 1983, monthly distribution checks of 
$10,000 were drawn on a Tabas Enterprises account and sent to 
Harriette through the United States mail.  Daniel was also 
provided with a $10,000 monthly draw.  In addition, from March 
                     
    
2Prior to Charles's death, each brother received a monthly 
disbursement of $10,000 from Tabas Enterprises.  In addition, the 
brothers appeared to have an arrangement under which Tabas 
Enterprises paid for many personal and business expenses. 
  
1983 to September 1986, Tabas Enterprises paid for various 
personal expenses incurred by Harriette and Daniel.  
 In September 1986, Tabas Enterprises stopped paying 
Harriette's personal expenses and also eliminated Harriette's 
$10,000 monthly draw.  Instead, Tabas Enterprises began paying a 
$15,000 monthly draw to the Estate.  At the same time, Daniel's 
monthly draw was increased to $15,000.  Tabas Enterprises 
continued to pay Daniel management fees and to cover his personal 
expenses.3 
 Shortly thereafter, the Estate brought suit against 
Daniel and others in the Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, Court 
of Common Pleas.  The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the 
Estate was not being allocated an equal share of the partnership 
income, that Daniel used Tabas Enterprises funds for personal 
purposes, that Daniel misled the Estate by directing the 
preparation of false and misleading financial statements, and 
that Daniel had breached his fiduciary duties to the Estate. 
                     
    
3The parties dispute whether plaintiffs were aware that 
Daniel was receiving substantial compensation from Tabas 
Enterprises in addition to his monthly draw check.  Defendants 
argue that, soon after Charles's death, plaintiffs knew of 
Daniel's compensation and therefore could not have been deceived 
by the monthly checks which served as the basis of the mail fraud 
predicate acts.  Plaintiffs acknowledge that they believed Daniel 
was taking more than he was entitled to under the partnership 
agreement; this was partly the basis for the 1986 state suit.  
They contend, however, that they did not know the extent to which 
they were being short-changed until Price Waterhouse was given 
access to Tabas Enterprises' records.  Consequently, plaintiffs 
assert that they initiated this suit as soon as they discovered 
the extent of the alleged fraudulent activity. 
  
 On November 20, 1987, the parties settled the state 
suit and agreed that the assets of Tabas Enterprises would be 
sold.  The settlement agreement established a schedule and method 
for liquidating the majority of the jointly held properties.4  In 
conjunction with the liquidation of the joint assets, the 
settlement agreement provided that "the Estate shall be given 
complete access to all properties, books and records in 
connection therewith[.]"  App. at 67 (Settlement Agreement at ¶ 
4(a)(i)).  The settlement agreement did not address the 
distribution of income earned after November 20, 1987, but did 
provide that: 
 
To the extent that the Partnership Agreement dated 
March 12, 1964 is not inconsistent with the provisions 
of this [Settlement] Agreement, the Partnership 
Agreement shall continue in full force and effect until 
the liquidation and auction [of Tabas Enterprises' 
assets] are completed. 
App. at 70 (Settlement Agreement ¶ 13).  Another provision of the 
settlement agreement provided that the parties would agree to 
execute a mutual general release: 
                     
    
4The settlement agreement also provided that Daniel would 
purchase the Estate's interest in Acorn Iron and Supply Company 
and $1.5 million in Royal Bank stock.  In addition, the Estate's 
interest in property on City Line Avenue was transferred to 
Daniel, apparently in exchange for monies from Tabas Enterprises.  
Defendants, pointing to the $16.9 million that the Estate has 
received pursuant to the settlement agreement and liquidation of 
Tabas Enterprises, assert that plaintiffs have been treated 
equally.  While plaintiffs do not appear to dispute the amount 
the Estate has received, they do assert that it has not received 
an equal one-half of the income as required under the partnership 
agreement. 
  
 
requiring the dismissal with prejudice of all parties 
in all litigation between or among Daniel, on the one 
hand, and the Estate or any of its executors, on the 
other hand, and excluding only the terms and conditions 
contained herein. 
App. at 69 (Settlement Agreement ¶ 9).   
 Lastly, the Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr.,5 was named 
to act as the arbitrator of any future disputes arising from the 
implementation of the settlement agreement that could not be 
resolved by the parties' legal representatives.  The settlement 
agreement specifically provided that Judge Yohn's decisions on 
such matters "shall be final, binding, and non-appealable."  App. 
at 70 (Settlement Agreement ¶ 12).  
 On May 15, 1990, Daniel and the Estate executed the 
mutual general release, which provided that, except for the 
obligations of the parties under the settlement agreement, the 
parties would release and forever discharge one another from: 
 
any and all actions, causes of action, demands, 
judgments, contracts, debts, dues, accounts, bonds, 
covenants, contracts, suits, claims, and demands of any 
nature whatsoever, whether in law, equity, arbitration 
or otherwise, whether know [sic] or unknown at the 
present time, which [either party] ever had, now has, 
hereinafter can, shall or may have, by reason of any 
matter, cause or thing whatsoever, from the beginning 
of the world to November 20, 1987. 
App. at 293 (emphasis added).   
                     
    
5At that time, Judge Yohn sat on the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas.  He is now a United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
  
 Despite the settlement agreement, plaintiffs remained 
dissatisfied with Daniel's compliance with the partnership 
agreement.  On July 25, 1990, Judge Yohn held a hearing to 
consider whether the settlement agreement barred the Estate from 
asserting claims for breach of the partnership agreement stemming 
from Daniel's management of Tabas Enterprises subsequent to 
November 20, 1987.  Finding that "[t]he provision of the 
partnership agreement of March 12, 1964 concerning distribution 
of income is not inconsistent with the provisions of the 
settlement agreement . . . as the settlement agreement contains 
no provisions concerning the distribution of income after 
November 20, 1987," Judge Yohn held that the Estate could "pursue 
any claims" against Daniel arising from the distribution of Tabas 
Enterprises' income after November 20, 1987.  App. at 1187 
(Arbitration Award No. 8).6 
 Following this decision, Daniel's counsel requested 
that Judge Yohn mediate the issues raised by plaintiffs' proposed 
RICO complaint.  Judge Yohn held two conferences with counsel to 
discuss, among other topics, the proposed RICO claims.  During 
oral argument on February 1, 1991, Daniel's counsel asserted 
that, because plaintiffs' proposed RICO complaint sought damages 
                     
    
6These rulings were premised upon Judge Yohn's finding that:  
"By agreement of the parties and with the concurrence of the 
arbitrator, the arbitrator has jurisdiction to rule upon the 
issue of whether the Estate may make claims against Daniel M. 
Tabas concerning his management of Tabas Enterprises subsequent 
to November 20, 1987."  App. at 1185. 
  
against defendants not named in the settlement agreement, the 
proposed RICO complaint was outside the scope of arbitration and 
therefore could not be decided by Judge Yohn in his role as 
arbitrator.  Nevertheless, Daniel's counsel expressed interest in 
having Judge Yohn serve as a mediator in an attempt to resolve 
the claims set forth in the proposed RICO complaint. 
 On February 20, 1991, Judge Yohn formally denied 
Daniel's request to mediate the dispute.  Instead, Judge Yohn 
ordered that:  "By agreement of the parties, and with the 
concurrence of the undersigned, the proposed 'RICO Complaint' may 
be filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and the issues raised therein will not 
be the subject of this procedure under the [Settlement] Agreement 
of November 20, 1987."  App. at 1282 (Arbitration Award No. 10). 
 Soon thereafter, plaintiffs brought the instant action, 
alleging violations of RICO §§ 1962(a), (b), (c), and (d), as 
well as several state law claims stemming from defendants' 
handling and distribution of Tabas Enterprises assets.  The 
initial complaint was filed on March 4, 1991.  The amended 
complaint was filed on May 20, 1991.7 
                     
    
7On May 29, 1991, the district court entered a scheduling 
order.  This schedule provided, inter alia, that discovery be 
completed by December 2, 1991.  The schedule also provided that 
defendants' motion for summary judgment had to be filed on or 
before October 21, 1991, and that plaintiffs' response was due by 
November 4, 1991.  Because this schedule required plaintiffs to 
respond prior to the completion of discovery, and because the 
parties had further disagreements about discovery, the factual 
record is not fully developed.  Nonetheless, the record is 
  
 Plaintiffs have appealed the district court's grant of 
defendants' motion for summary judgment.  On appeal, we are 
required to base our review of the district court's decision on 
the evidence of record.  Accordingly, before we turn to the 
merits of the parties' assertions, we will summarize the record 
submitted to this court. 
 Most significantly, the record contains two financial 
reports by Price Waterhouse, analyzing Tabas Enterprises' 
financial and operational records.  Plaintiffs' counsel retained 
Price Waterhouse to determine whether these records reflected the 
equal distribution of income to the Estate as required under ¶ 3 
of the partnership agreement. 
 The first Price Waterhouse report analyzed Tabas 
Enterprises' financial records dating from Charles's death in 
1983 through early 1990, focusing on the period after November 
20, 1987.  Then, in late 1991, after the amended complaint was 
filed, Price Waterhouse completed a supplemental report, 
analyzing Tabas Enterprises' records from October 1989 through 
July 1991.  In total, the Price Waterhouse reports documented 
more than three and one-half years of activity subsequent to the 
November 1987 settlement agreement.  In both reports, Price 
Waterhouse concluded that "the books and records of Tabas 
                                                                  
sufficient to support our conclusion that the requisites for RICO 
continuity have been met. 
  
Enterprises do not reflect the equal distribution of income," and 
that "indications of fraud exist."8  App. at 352, 460-61. 
 The Price Waterhouse reports revealed a continuing 
series of transactions to divert Tabas Enterprises' income for 
the personal use of Daniel and his family, through direct 
monetary benefits as well as other types of benefits.  In its 
first report, for instance, Price Waterhouse itemized a 
substantial number of items, purchased with Tabas Enterprises' 
income, for which there was no adequate documentation or 
explanation substantiating an ordinary and necessary business 
purpose for the expense.  The report noted that, to the extent 
that Daniel purchased these items using Tabas Enterprises' 
income, such expenses "would inappropriately reduce the Estate's 
interest in Tabas Enterprises by reducing income available for 
distribution to the Estate."  App. at 354.  According to the 
Price Waterhouse report, these purchases included personal 
apparel, homeowner's dues for Daniel's vacation home in Vermont, 
meals and other purchases in cities where Daniel had vacation 
homes, meals and other purchases in ten foreign countries, 
                     
    
8Price Waterhouse noted that its formal "opinion" was subject 
to scope limitations as discussed within each report.  Our review 
of these limitations indicates that most were caused by Tabas 
Enterprises' failure to cooperate with the Price Waterhouse 
auditors.  In addition, Price Waterhouse described Tabas 
Enterprises' major records depository as in a "state of 
disarray."  In considering these reports, we will weigh the 
effect of the scope limitations in light of our conclusion that 
most limitations to the analysis were a result of Tabas 
Enterprises' efforts to hinder the Price Waterhouse audits. 
  
prescription medicine, and a pool heater installed at Daniel's 
home in Pennsylvania.  The total cost of these and other similar 
expenses was approximated at $140,000.  
 Other problem areas cited in the first report were 
Tabas Enterprises' payment of $67,000 in compensation for the 
provision of home services, such as maid, gardening, and handyman 
services, for Daniel and his family; the assignment of 24 
automobiles owned by Tabas Enterprises to Daniel and his family, 
including family members who were not employed by Tabas 
Enterprises; Tabas Enterprises' payment of the automobile 
insurance, repairs and maintenance, gasoline,9 car phones, auto 
club membership, registration fees, tags, and title fees for all 
24 cars; Tabas Enterprises' payment of telephone bills for 
Daniel's primary and vacation residences; and Tabas Enterprises' 
payment of insurance coverage for non-partnership assets, 
including Daniel's six antique automobiles.   
 Price Waterhouse's second report noted that, between 
the completion of the first and second reports, Daniel had 
reimbursed Tabas Enterprises for only a small portion of these 
expenses.10  The second report also noted that many of the 
                     
    
9The report found these gasoline charges, in excess of 
$18,000, especially problematic, since the relevant documents 
revealed routine submissions of multiple requests for 
reimbursement arising from a single receipt. 
    
10In his deposition, Daniel testified that all unreimbursed 
expenses represented legitimate business expenses.  For most of 
these expenses, however, Daniel could not provide any specific 
recollection of the business purpose involved.   
  
questionable expenses detailed in the first report continued to 
occur.  For instance, the second report identified an additional 
$78,000 in payments for personal services and an additional 
$35,000 in phone bills for Daniel's private residences and mobile 
telephones.  The second report also noted that Daniel and his 
family continued to charge personal items to Tabas Enterprises, 
including personal apparel, homeowner's dues for his vacation 
home in Vermont, and meals. 
 In addition to investigating nonmonetary benefits, the 
Price Waterhouse reports also examined the direct monetary 
benefits received by Daniel and his family from Tabas 
Enterprises.  The reports found that between November 1987 and 
November 1989, Daniel received $1,502,000 in salary partnership 
distributions, management fees and incentives, gratuities, and 
bonuses from Tabas Enterprises, and that for the period between 
November 1989 and June 1991, he received $1,166,000.  The reports 
also found that, during this period, in which Daniel was paid a 
total of $2,668,000, the Estate received partnership 
distributions totalling $660,000.11 
 According to the Price Waterhouse reports, the monetary 
payments to Daniel's family during this time also eclipsed those 
                     
    
11Price Waterhouse also noted that, in addition to his Tabas 
Enterprises income, Daniel received compensation as Chairman of 
the Board of Royal Bank.  At his deposition, Daniel testified 
that he worked 60-70 hours per week for Tabas Enterprises, app. 
at 1683, and that his Royal Bank time commitment consisted of 
Thursday morning executive staff meetings and a board meeting one 
evening each month.  App. at 614. 
  
received by the Estate.  The reports documented that between 
November 1987 and June 1991, Daniel's family, including his six 
children and one son-in-law, received $1,363,000 from Tabas 
Enterprises in the form of salaries, management fees and 
incentives, gratuities, bonuses, and consulting fees.  The 
amended complaint alleges that payments to Daniel's children and 
son-in-law "do not constitute reasonable salaries for work which 
they actually performed and that some of those children and/or 
their spouses were 'phantom' or 'ghost' employees who performed 
little or no work at all."  App. at 21 (Amended Complaint ("AC") 
¶ 25). 
 The first Price Waterhouse report also noted that, in 
addition to receiving compensation from Tabas Enterprises, 
certain members of Daniel's family also worked for and received 
compensation from Royal Bank.  For instance, Lee Tabas served as 
President of Royal Bank, Robert Tabas served as Vice President, 
and Susan Tabas Tepper served as Director of Marketing. 
 Finally, in addition to the above findings, both Price 
Waterhouse reports noted that "the Estate may also have been 
subjected to the risk of additional taxes, interest, and 
penalties" due to apparent Internal Revenue Service reporting 
violations by Tabas Enterprises.  App. at 362, 467. 
 B. 
 Count I of the amended complaint alleges that, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), (b), and (c), the defendants 
  
conspired to defraud the Estate of its equal share of Tabas 
Enterprises' income, to which it was entitled under the 
partnership agreement, through a pattern of racketeering activity 
including mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.12  
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants conducted a 
scheme to defraud the Estate of its equal share of the 
partnership's income by wrongfully diverting Tabas Enterprises 
funds to pay for the personal expenses of Daniel and his family 
and by understating the Estate's share of the income.  Plaintiffs 
assert that, from the time of Charles's death through the period 
in which the amended complaint was filed, Daniel "continuously 
made false representations to the Estate by mail and fraudulently 
distributed millions of dollars of Tabas Enterprises' funds to 
himself and to members of his family in a scheme to defraud the 
Estate of income to which it was entitled."  App. at 20 (AC ¶ 
24).  
 Plaintiffs specifically allege that Daniel, Campbell, 
and McSwiggan committed forty-one acts of mail fraud between 
December 1987 and February 1991 for "the purpose of executing the 
                     
    
12Count II of the amended complaint alleges that defendants 
violated § 1962(d) by conspiring to violate subsections (a), (b), 
and (c). 
 Counts III-VI of the amended complaint allege state law 
claims that are not central to this appeal, including breach of 
fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and conversion.  The 
district court dismissed these state law claims without 
prejudice.  Because we find that the district court erred in 
dismissing Counts I and II, we will instruct the district court 
to vacate the dismissal of plaintiffs' supplemental state law 
claims. 
  
scheme to defraud the Estate of its equal share of income."  App. 
at 43 (AC ¶ 49).13  Thirty-nine of these forty-one acts 
represented monthly disbursements of $15,000 from Tabas Brothers 
(a holding of Tabas Enterprises) to the Estate.  The remaining 
two acts involve the mailing of various IRS forms from Tabas 
Enterprises to the Estate reflecting income earned and business 
expenses incurred by certain Tabas Enterprises entities.  
Plaintiffs contend that the mailing of the monthly checks by 
defendants "constituted an intentional misrepresentation" that 
one-half of the income of Tabas Enterprises was being paid to the 
Estate pursuant to the partnership agreement.  App. at 46 (AC ¶ 
50).   
 Finding that the dispute did not present a sufficient 
threat to satisfy RICO's "continuity" requirement, the district 
court granted defendants' summary judgment motion.  The district 
court reasoned that: 
 
  Plaintiffs' claims essentially allege one fraudulent 
scheme perpetrated against one victim by one 
perpetrator.  The gist of plaintiffs' complaint is that 
Daniel Tabas has failed to abide by the partnership 
agreement made with his brother, Charles, and that 
Daniel has employed various methods of trickery to 
                     
    
13Plaintiffs also allege as predicate acts defendants' use of 
the United States mails to send checks to Daniel's children and 
son-in-law for work not performed.  We do not rely on these 
allegations, however, because plaintiffs have not produced any 
evidence to counter McSwiggan's deposition testimony that these 
checks were delivered by courier.  See, e.g., Utz v. Correa, 631 
F.Supp. 592, 596 (S.D.N.Y., 1986) (delivery of letter by 
messenger did not violate the mail fraud statute since the United 
States mails were not used). 
  
cheat Charles's heirs of their fifty percent share of 
the business that Charles and Daniel built.  The sole 
victim of this scheme is Charles Tabas's estate.  The 
sole perpetrator is Daniel Tabas or individuals under 
his control.  No one else is affected.  There is no 
threat to the community at large.  This is not a case 
where the predicate acts are "part of an entity's 
regular way of doing business," such as would affect 
others doing business with the entity. 
 
  The partnership between Charles and Daniel is 
currently in the process of liquidation.  All of the 
fraudulent activity alleged in this suit will cease 
once the liquidation process is complete.  Given the 
Court of Appeals' admonition that "[i]t remains an open 
question whether RICO liability is ever appropriate for 
a single-scheme, single-victim conduct threatening no 
future harm," we simply do not find that the 
defendants' alleged conduct in this case "pose[s] a 
societal threat worthy of the draconian penalties and 
remedies available under RICO." 
District Court opinion at 8-10; App. at 1376-78 (citations 
omitted) (footnotes omitted).  Plaintiffs filed a timely notice 
of appeal of the district court's grant of summary judgment to 
defendants.  Defendants also filed an appeal, seeking review of 
the district court's decision to dismiss the state claims without 
prejudice.  Following the filing of the panel's decision, we 
granted appellants' petition for rehearing in banc and vacated 
the panel opinion.  
 II. 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  The 
district court's federal question jurisdiction was invoked 
because Counts I and II of the amended complaint raise claims 
under RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 and 1962.  The district court's 
  
supplemental jurisdiction was invoked because Counts III through 
VI of the amended complaint raise claims that are so related to 
the claims in Count I and II that they form part of the same case 
or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.  The district court's supplemental jurisdiction  
was invoked because Counts III through VI of the amended 
complaint raise claims that are so related to the claims in Count 
I and II that they form part of the same case or controversy 
under Article III of the United States Constitution.  Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, this Court has appellate jurisdiction over the 
final orders of the district court.14 
 This Court has plenary review over the district court's 
grant of summary judgment.  See Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark 
Assocs., 942 F.2d 189, 194 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991).  On review of the 
district court's order for summary judgment, "we 'apply the same 
test the district court should have utilized initially.'"  Erie 
Telecommunications v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(citation omitted).  "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
we must be convinced 'that the prevailing party has successfully 
demonstrated that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
                     
    
14The district court's first order, dated May 26, 1993, 
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on Counts I and 
II, and dismissed Counts III, IV, and V pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c)(3).  The district court's second order, dated June 2, 
1993, amended the first order to include dismissal of Count VI 
pursuant to § 1367(c)(3). 
  
matter of law.'"  Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
322 (1986)). 
 In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, 
"[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all 
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor."  Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 255.  The inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a 
sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or 
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a 
matter of law."  Id. at 251-52. 
 III. 
 The first issue we must address is defendants' 
contention that this lawsuit is precluded by the 1987 settlement 
agreement and the 1990 mutual release.  This question was 
considered by the panel only.  We find defendants' argument to be 
without merit.  
 First, binding arbitration by Judge Yohn holds the 
present claims viable.  The settlement agreement provides for 
final, binding arbitration of any dispute "as to the provisions 
of this Agreement or as to the implementation or operation of the 
provisions of this Agreement" between Daniel and the Estate.  
App. at 70 (Settlement Agreement ¶ 12).  The very issue of 
whether claims such as this lawsuit could be brought was 
submitted to Judge Yohn, the arbitrator, who determined initially 
that "the arbitrator has jurisdiction to rule upon the issue of 
  
whether the Estate may make claims against Daniel M. Tabas 
concerning his management of Tabas Enterprises subsequent to 
November 20, 1987."  App. at 1185 (Arbitration Award No. 8).  On 
the merits, Judge Yohn held that the Estate could pursue any 
claims which it might have against Daniel "for an alleged breach 
of his fiduciary duty [to the Estate] after November 20, 1987," 
and "for the unequal distribution of the income of Tabas 
Enterprises subsequent to November 20, 1987."  Id. at 1187. 
 Under the settlement agreement, Judge Yohn's decision 
is "final, binding, and non-appealable," app. at 70 (Settlement 
Agreement ¶ 12), and we must adhere to it under federal and 
Pennsylvania law.  See Apex Fountain Sales v. Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 
1089, 1094-95 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1987) (an arbitrator's decision is 
binding under federal law unless "an arbitrator 'manifests an 
infidelity'" to her obligation to interpret the agreement at 
issue, or there is "corruption, fraud or partiality," or a party 
was denied a "fundamentally fair hearing") (citations omitted); 
International Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers v. School Dist., 
350 A.2d 804, 808 (Pa. 1976) (an arbitrator's decision shall not 
be set aside "unless it is alleged and proven by clear, precise 
and convincing evidence that the parties were denied a hearing or 
that there was fraud, misconduct, corruption or some other 
irregularity of this nature on the part of the Arbitrator which 
caused him to render an unjust, inequitable or unconscionable 
finding").  Defendants have not alleged any action on the part of 
  
Judge Yohn amounting to corruption, fraud, or partiality.  In 
addition, defendants have presented no evidence that Judge Yohn 
failed to provide a hearing to consider each party's views prior 
to his decision.  In fact, the record clearly indicates that 
Judge Yohn held a hearing on this question and considered 
numerous exchanges of correspondence before ruling on this 
matter. 
 Second, even if we were to make our own evaluation of 
whether the 1987 settlement agreement and the 1990 release 
precluded this lawsuit, we would conclude that it does not.  
Defendants' reliance on Main Line Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount 
Film Distrib. Corp., 298 F.2d 801 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 
U.S. 939 (1962), is misplaced.  Defendants assert that Main Line 
stands for the proposition that where "the initial lawsuit 
contained prayers for injunctive relief, the execution of a 
general release releases and extinguishes complaints for future 
conduct."  Defendants-appellees' Brief at 21.  Consequently, 
defendants contend, plaintiffs' suit is barred by the settlement 
agreement and the mutual release signed by the Estate and Daniel. 
 In Main Line, plaintiffs demanded injunctive relief and 
treble damages in a civil antitrust suit stemming from 
Paramount's distribution of motion pictures.  The district court 
dismissed the suit, holding that the case had been settled during 
pre-trial negotiations by an "oral agreement" between the 
parties.  The oral agreement provided that Main Line would drop 
  
its suit in exchange for $10,000.  Main Line refused to comply 
with the oral agreement, however, complaining that Paramount 
attempted to add language to the agreement when it was 
memorialized in writing.  Specifically, Main Line rejected 
language that required it to acknowledge that the complained of 
distribution procedures were reasonable. 
 Main Line appealed the dismissal to this court.  We 
then considered whether the initial oral agreement included a 
release to the effect that Paramount could continue to distribute 
films in the same manner it had prior to Main Line's suit for 
injunctive relief.  We noted: 
 
Had this been an action for damages only, without a 
prayer that the defendants be restrained from 
continuing or repeating the licensing practices of 
which the plaintiff complained, the essential feature 
of any understanding to settle the suit for a stated 
sum would have been the plaintiffs' promise to forego a 
money claim, the only matter in controversy.  Here, the 
suit contained a demand for injunctive prohibition of 
future wrongful conduct as well as a claim for money 
damages for alleged past misconduct.  In such 
circumstances a reasonable person agreeing, without any 
expression of limitation, to accept a sum in settlement 
of the litigation should and reasonably would 
understand that both aspects of the suit were covered 
by the settlement. 
298 F.2d at 803 (emphasis added). 
 In Main Line, plaintiffs could point to no limitations, 
expressed or implied, in their oral agreement with defendants.  
Accordingly, their settlement agreement covered their prayers for 
both injunctive relief and money damages.  In the present case, 
  
however, the mutual release signed by plaintiffs and Daniel 
expressly limits the applicability of the release to any claims 
arising "from the beginning of the world to November 20, 1987."  
App. at 294.  This express limitation distinguishes the instant 
case from the facts presented in Main Line. 
 Defendants also draw the Court's attention to our 
statement in Main Line that "[c]ertainly, a defendant offering a 
sum in settlement of a suit asking, among other things, for an 
injunction against similar conduct, would not understand that a 
similar demand could be asserted the day after settlement."  298 
F.2d at 803 (emphasis added).  The Estate's state suit here, 
however, although denominated a "Complaint in Equity," did not 
seek broad injunctive relief.  The holding in Main Line relies on 
the fact that the plaintiff specifically sought to enjoin 
Paramount from distributing motion pictures using methods that 
plaintiff alleged violated the civil antitrust laws.  In the 
instant case, the plaintiffs' state suit asked that Daniel be 
removed from any position at Tabas Enterprises and that its 
businesses and properties be liquidated.  Rather than controlling 
future conduct, the state suit primarily sought a dissolution of 
Tabas Enterprises and redress for the alleged past wrongs 
committed against the Estate's interest in the partnership.  It 
follows, therefore, that the subsequent federal action did not 
constitute an effort to enjoin conduct that the settlement of the 
first suit had resolved.  This determination, together with our 
  
earlier finding that the settlement agreement bars only claims 
existing up to November 20, 1987, would lead us to conclude that 
defendants' reliance upon Main Line is misplaced.   
 IV. 
 Having found that plaintiffs' lawsuit is not precluded 
by the 1987 settlement agreement and the 1990 mutual release, we 
now turn to the district court's decision that plaintiffs failed 
to allege a course of conduct sufficient to establish a RICO 
"pattern of racketeering conduct" because plaintiffs failed to 
satisfy RICO's "continuity" requirement. 
 The RICO statute provides for civil damages for "any 
person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1962]."  18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).  A common 
thread running throughout § 1962 is that an injured party must 
demonstrate that the defendant was engaged in a "pattern of 
racketeering activity."  Section 1962(a) prohibits "any person 
who has received any income derived . . . from a pattern of 
racketeering activity" from using that money to acquire or 
operate any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce.  Section 
1962(b) prohibits any person from acquiring, maintaining an 
interest in, or controlling any such enterprise "through a 
pattern of racketeering activity."  Section 1962(c) prohibits any 
person employed by or associated with an enterprise engaged in 
interstate commerce from conducting or participating in the 
affairs of the enterprise through "a pattern of racketeering 
  
activity."  Finally, section 1962(d) prohibits any person from 
conspiring to violate subsections (a), (b), or (c).   
 Central to the dispute in this case is the question 
whether defendants participated in "a pattern of racketeering 
activity."  The RICO statute defines a "pattern" of racketeering 
activity as requiring "at least two acts of racketeering 
activity" within a ten year period.  18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).  The 
statute also enumerates the offenses which constitute 
"racketeering activity," including crimes that have traditionally 
been associated with the transgressions of racketeers:  murder, 
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing 
in obscene matter, and dealing in narcotic or other dangerous 
drugs.  18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).  The statutory enumeration is, 
however, expansive and goes on to include specific federal 
offenses which, although they may often be committed by those 
whom we would categorize as "racketeers," also fall into the 
category of common law or "garden variety" fraud and which would, 
in the past, have been the subject of commercial litigation under 
state law.  Among these broadly delineated federal offenses are 
mail fraud and wire fraud.15  These offenses are the ones that 
                     
    
15Mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, is the racketeering activity 
involved in the case before us.  Section 1341 provides in 
pertinent part: 
 Whoever, having devised . . . any scheme or 
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money 
or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises, . . 
. for the purpose of executing such scheme or 
artifice . . . places in any post office or 
authorized depository for mail matter, any 
  
many consider to be the most troublesome as RICO predicate acts.  
 The inclusion within the scope of civil RICO of these 
types of fraud, more prevalent in the commercial world than in 
the world of racketeers, has caused concern that RICO sweeps too 
broad a swathe.  See, e.g., Note, Civil RICO:  The Temptation and 
Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1101, 1105 
(1982) ("Given the prevalence of mail and wire use in commercial 
transactions, RICO's provision for a private cause of action 
predicated on violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes 
virtually federalizes common law fraud"). 
                                                                  
matter or thing whatever to be sent or 
delivered by the Postal Service, . . . shall 
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned 
not more than five years, or both. 
  
 The federal offense of mail fraud was originally 
enacted by Congress in 1872 as a part of the recodification of 
the postal laws.  The Supreme Court in its first review of the 
mail fraud statute made clear that its scope was broad.  The 
Court held that the statute reached beyond the common law 
definition of "false pretences" to encompass "everything designed 
to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or 
suggestions and promises as to the future."  Durland v. United 
States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896).  Fraud, involving the use of 
the postal system to carry it out, was made a federal offense by 
Congress with the "purpose of protecting the public against all 
such intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post 
office from being used to carry them into effect . . .."  Id. at 
314. 
 Judge Greenberg, in his dissent, queries whether 
Congress intended RICO to be applied to a defendant, 
participating in a scheme to defraud, who mails substantial 
payments but not to a similar defendant who delivers the payments 
by hand.  See [typescript at 14].  The clear answer to this 
question is "yes" because, first, the former example constitutes 
mail fraud and the latter does not and, second, Congress has 
chosen to include mail fraud as a RICO predicate act.   
  
 If we examine the language of the statute itself, in an 
attempt to discern the scope of civil RICO, we find ourselves 
lost in a land with few signposts.  Section 1961(5) defines 
"pattern" as requiring "at least two acts of racketeering 
activity."  The breadth of the predicate acts, described in § 
1961(1), combined with § 1961(5)'s loose definition of pattern, 
has led many courts to recoil from the inclusion within RICO of 
offenses which were not considered to be the crimes of gangsters.  
Such court-imposed limitations on the scope of civil RICO were 
first reviewed by the Supreme Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex 
Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).  In Sedima, the Supreme Court set out 
an expansive definition of the concept of "pattern" in civil 
RICO.   
 Sedima arose from an action filed in the Eastern 
District of New York by a Belgian corporation, based on § 1964(c) 
and (d) and predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud, charging 
that Imrex, Sedima's partner in a joint venture, had presented 
inflated bills and had cheated Sedima out of a portion of its 
proceeds by collecting for nonexistent expenses.  The district 
court dismissed the RICO counts for failure to state a claim, 
holding that a RICO-type injury must be based on allegations of 
some sort of distinct "racketeering injury" or "competitive 
injury."  574 F.Supp. 963, 965 (1983).  The dismissal was 
affirmed by a divided panel of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  741 F.2d 482 (1984).  The court of appeals clarified 
  
the type of injury which it required to be alleged, finding that 
"it is better to identify the RICO standing requirement as a 
'racketeering injury' requirement rather than a 'competitive 
injury' requirement . . .."  Id. at 496.  The court of appeals 
further required that, before a private civil RICO action could 
be brought, the plaintiff must show that the defendants had been 
criminally convicted of the predicate acts.  Id. at 503.  The 
Supreme Court rejected both of these holdings.   
 Justice White, writing for the majority in Sedima, 
stated "we can find no support in the statute's history, its 
language, or considerations of policy for a requirement that a 
private treble-damages action under § 1964(c) can proceed only 
against a defendant who has already been criminally convicted."  
473 U.S. at 493.  Concerning the requirement of racketeering 
injury, Justice White stated that 
 [W]e perceive no distinct "racketeering 
injury" requirement.  Given that 
"racketeering activity" consists of no more 
and no less than commission of a predicate 
act, § 1961(1), we are initially doubtful 
about a requirement of a "racketeering 
injury" separate from the harm from the 
predicate acts.  A reading of the statute 
belies any such requirement. . . . If the 
defendant engages in a pattern of 
racketeering activity in a manner forbidden 
by these provisions [§ 1962(a)-(c)], and the 
racketeering activities injure the plaintiff 
in his business or property, the plaintiff 
has a claim under § 1964(c).  There is no 
room in the statutory language for an 
additional, amorphous "racketeering injury" 
requirement. 
  
Id. at 495. 
 Justice White based this less restrictive reading of 
the statute on prior case law and the general principles 
surrounding the statute:  "RICO is to be read broadly.  This is 
the lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously expansive 
language and overall approach, but also of its express admonition 
that RICO is to 'be liberally construed to effectuate its 
remedial purposes.'"  Id. at 497-98 (citations omitted). 
 The Court recognized that this interpretation of the 
statute would permit its use not only against mobsters and 
organized criminals but also against "respected and legitimate 
'enterprises.'"  Id. at 499.  Nevertheless, the Court found that 
Congress "wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' 
enterprises.  "The former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity 
for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences."  Id. 
(citation omitted).  The Court concluded: 
  It is true that private civil actions 
under the statute are being brought almost 
solely against such defendants, rather than 
against the archetypal, intimidating mobster.  
Yet this defect--if defect it is--is inherent 
in the statute as written, and its correction 
must lie with Congress.  It is not for the 
judiciary to eliminate the private action in 
situations where Congress has provided it 
simply because plaintiffs are not taking 
advantage of it in its more difficult 
applications. 
Id. at 499-500 (footnote omitted).   
  
 Justice White then suggested that Congress and the 
courts develop a meaningful concept of "pattern" in order to 
narrow the scope of civil RICO:  
 The "extraordinary" uses to which civil RICO 
has been put appear to be primarily the 
result of the breadth of the predicate 
offenses, in particular the inclusion of 
wire, mail, and securities fraud, and the 
failure of Congress and the courts to develop 
a meaningful concept of "pattern." 
Id. at 500. 
 Despite this invitation from the Court, Congress to 
date has not chosen to enact legislation which would narrow the 
scope of civil RICO or to define more exactly what is "pattern."  
Moreover, the efforts of the courts to do so have not been 
entirely successful.  Our attempts to design a meaningful concept 
of pattern have continued to collide with the broad language of 
the statute.  In response, however, to Sedima, the various 
circuits began to structure guidelines for determining whether a 
RICO pattern had been established.  In the Third Circuit, for 
instance, in Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 
832 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987), we rejected the district court's 
requirement in that case that there be two or more unlawful 
schemes, and we then set forth six factors to be used in 
determining whether a pattern of racketeering activity has been 
established in a given case.  These factors are:  (1) the number 
of unlawful acts; (2) the length of time over which the acts were 
committed; (3) the similarity of the acts; (4) the number of 
  
victims; (5) the number of perpetrators; and (6) the character of 
the unlawful activity.  Id. at 39. 
 Other circuits established other criteria.  In the 
Eighth Circuit, the test for a pattern of racketeering activity 
was much more restrictive:  proof of multiple illegal schemes was 
required.  See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 
(8th Cir. 1986).  Following this precedent, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district's court's dismissal of 
petitioners' complaint in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. 
Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987).  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve the conflict between the circuits over 
whether single or multiple schemes were required to demonstrate a 
RICO pattern.  
 In its opinion in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. 
Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989), the Court set out its second analysis 
of the requirements of civil RICO.  First, as to single versus 
multiple schemes, the Court noted that the word "scheme" is not 
found in the RICO statute and indeed that what constitutes a 
"scheme" is to be found "in the eye of the beholder, since 
whether a scheme exists depends on the level of generality at 
which criminal activity is viewed."  492 U.S. at 241 and n.3.  
The Court then examined the statute and its legislative history 
in an attempt to determine the elements of the pattern 
requirement.  From this review, the Court concluded that "to 
prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff must show 
  
that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they 
amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity."  Id. 
at 239.  
 Under the first, or "relatedness," requirement of the 
RICO statute, as interpreted in H.J. Inc., predicate acts are 
related if they "have the same or similar purposes, results, 
participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are 
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not 
isolated events."  Id. at 240 (quoting the partially repealed 
Title X of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 
3575, et seq.).16   
 As for the second, or "continuity," prong of the 
analysis, the  Court in H.J. Inc. attempted to promulgate a 
somewhat flexible approach, based upon a "commonsense, everyday 
understanding of RICO's language and Congress' gloss on it."  Id. 
at 241.  With this analytical approach in mind, the Court decided 
that "[w]hat a plaintiff or prosecutor must prove is continuity 
of racketeering activity, or its threat, simpliciter."  Id.  
 In explicating how a plaintiff could make this 
continuity showing, the Court described continuity as "both a 
closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed 
period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature 
projects into the future with a threat of repetition."  Id.  "It 
                     
    
16The parties do not dispute that the relatedness prong has 
been met in the present case. 
 
  
is, in either case, centrally a temporal concept,"  id. at 241-
42, so that a party may establish continuity as a closed-ended 
concept by "proving a series of related predicates extending over 
a substantial period of time."  Id. at 242 (emphasis added).   
 Thus, H.J. Inc. makes clear that the continuity 
requirement can be met by establishing long-term criminal conduct 
but does not define what length of time qualifies as 
"substantial" for this purpose.  The Court in H.J. Inc. also gave 
examples of how the threat of continued racketeering activity 
might be demonstrated.  One example is that of a hoodlum who 
sells "insurance" to storekeepers to prevent the breaking of 
their shop windows.  Id.  Another example is that of an ongoing 
entity which commits the predicate acts or offenses as its 
regular way of doing business.  Id.  In giving this last example, 
the Court noted that such a business may be either a criminal or 
a legitimate enterprise and concluded: 
 The continuity requirement is likewise 
satisfied where it is shown that the 
predicates are a regular way of conducting 
defendant's ongoing legitimate business (in 
the sense that it is not a business that 
exists for criminal purposes), or of 
conducting or participating in an ongoing and 
legitimate RICO "enterprise." 
Id. at 243 (footnote omitted).  The clear implication of this 
language is that the ambit of RICO may encompass a "legitimate" 
businessman who regularly conducts his business through 
illegitimate means, that is, who repeatedly defrauds those with 
whom he deals and in the process commits predicate acts, for 
  
instance by using the postal service as a means of accomplishing 
his scheme. 
 The Court went on in H.J. Inc., at the urging of 
various amici, to consider, and to reject, a requirement that "a 
defendant's racketeering activities form a pattern only if they 
are characteristic either of organized crime in the traditional 
sense, or of an organized-crime-type perpetrator, that is, of an 
association dedicated to the repeated commission of criminal 
offenses."  Id. at 243-44.  The Court found that there was no 
textual support in the statute for such a requirement and that 
the statutory language did not support the limitation that 
racketeering acts be the work of an association or group rather 
than of an individual.  Id. at 244.   
 These determinations in H.J. Inc., that the predicate 
acts may be the regular way in which a legitimate business 
operates and that the racketeering activities may form a pattern 
even though they are the acts of an individual rather than of a 
group or of an association, enforce the Court's holding in Sedima 
that RICO reaches both "legitimate" and "illegitimate" 
enterprises.  The Court in H.J. Inc. also rejected the employment 
of a definitional device, such as "scheme," to delineate 
racketeering activity, when the device employed, like "scheme," 
may be manipulated to satisfy the necessary criterion.  See id. 
at 241 and n.3.   
  
 Whatever view we may have of Congress's original intent 
in enacting the RICO statute, we feel constrained, in applying 
the statute today, to follow the directives given by the Court in 
Sedima and H.J. Inc. 
 Since H.J. Inc., this court has faced the question of 
continued racketeering activity in several cases, each time 
finding that conduct lasting no more than twelve months did not 
meet the standard for closed-ended continuity.  See Hughes v. 
Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 610-11 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(fraudulent conduct lasting twelve months does not establish 
closed-ended continuity); Hindes v. Castle, 937 F.2d 868, 875 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (eight month period of predicate acts without a threat 
of future criminal conduct does not satisfy continuity 
requirement); Kehr Packages v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 
1413 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 422-23 
(3d Cir. 1990) (same); Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 894 
F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1990) (seven month single-victim, single-injury 
scheme does not satisfy continuity requirement).17  In Hughes, we 
                     
    
17In Marshall-Silver, we considered whether Congress intended 
RICO to apply in the situation of an extended scheme which posed 
no "significant societal threat" beyond its extended duration.  
894 F.2d at 597.  Because the scheme there lasted only seven 
months and posed no threat of recurrence, we stated that we would 
not resolve the "societal threat" issue.  In view, however, of 
the Court's refusal in Sedima and H.J. Inc. to require 
racketeering injury, or prior conviction of the predicate acts, 
or multiple schemes, or racketeering acts by an association or 
group rather than by an individual, we cannot conclude that, in 
order to satisfy the RICO continuity requirement, the Court would 
require the existence of a "societal threat," whatever exactly 
that may be, beyond the commission of the criminal predicate 
  
distinguished cases in other circuits in which closed-ended 
continuity had been established, noting that those cases involved 
conduct lasting "years, sometimes over a decade."  Hughes, 945 
F.2d at 611.   
 In evaluating the present case in accord with this 
precedent, we will first consider whether closed-ended continuity 
has been established.  At the outset, we note that in civil RICO 
complaints based on predicate acts of mail fraud  
 
the continuity test requires us to look beyond the 
mailings and examine the underlying scheme or artifice.  
Although the mailing is the actual criminal act, the 
instances of deceit constituting the underlying 
fraudulent scheme are more relevant to the continuity 
analysis. 
                                                                  
acts.  To the extent that Marshall-Silver can be read to hold 
otherwise, it is overruled. 
  
Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1414.18   Consequently, in determining 
                     
    
18Defendants' assertion that the mailings involved must 
themselves be relied upon by the victim of the fraud in order for 
a RICO claim to be established is inaccurate.  As this Court 
stated in Kehr Packages, "completely 'innocent' mailings can 
satisfy the mailing element."  926 F.2d at 1415 (citing Schmuck 
v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989)).  Indeed, mailings 
"designed to lull [fraud] victims into a false sense of security, 
postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and 
therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely 
than if no mailings had taken place" have been found to 
constitute actionable mail fraud.  Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 
1416 n.3 (quoting United States v. Lebovitz, 669 F.2d 894, 896 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 929 (1982)). 
 Additionally, the use of the mails need not be an 
essential element of the fraudulent scheme.  Rather, so long as 
the mailings are "incident to an essential part of the scheme," 
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954), the mailing 
element is satisfied.  This principle is elucidated by a review 
of the facts in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989).  
In that case, Wayne Schmuck was engaged in a fraudulent scheme in 
which he would purchase used cars, roll back their odometers, and 
sell the cars to retailers for a price higher than their actual 
worth.  After purchasing an automobile from Schmuck and selling 
it to a customer, the dealers, in order to complete the resale of 
each automobile, would submit a title application form to the 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation.  The mailing of these 
forms constituted the mailing element of Schmuck's indictment on 
12 counts of mail fraud.  The Supreme Court found that those 
mailing were sufficient to sustain Schmuck's indictment on mail 
fraud charges, reasoning that  
 
Schmuck's scheme would have come to an abrupt halt if 
the dealers either had lost faith in Schmuck or had not 
been able to resell the cars obtained from him.  These 
resales and Schmuck's relationship with the retail 
dealers naturally depended on the successful passage of 
title among the various parties.  Thus, although the 
registration-form mailings may not have contributed 
directly to the duping of either the retail dealers or 
the customers, they were necessary to the passage of 
title, which in turn was essential to the perpetuation 
of Schmuck's scheme. 
 
Id. at 712.  
  
whether or not continuity has been established in the present 
case, we must focus on the duration of the underlying scheme.  
Just as the mailings are an element of the federal offense of 
mail fraud, so too is the scheme or artifice to defraud.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 1341, set out in footnote 15 supra.  Each time 
defendants misrepresented the business nature of an expense, made 
a questionable charge, or received compensation to which they 
were not entitled, they lessened the income available to the 
Estate.  Plaintiffs have provided evidence that these activities, 
which implemented defendants' purported scheme to defraud the 
Estate, lasted more than three and a half years, from November 
10, 1987, to July 1991.  We conclude that a scheme lasting over 
three years extends over a "substantial" period of time and 
therefore constitutes the type of "long-term criminal conduct" 
that RICO was enacted to address.  See United States v. Pelullo, 
964 F.2d 193, 209 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a jury could find 
a nineteen month period of racketeering activity sufficient to 
                                                                  
  In the instant case, it is clear that the mailings were 
incident to an essential part of the scheme.  Had the defendants 
failed to mail disbursement checks to plaintiffs, plaintiffs 
would have immediately been alerted to defendants' alleged 
scheme.  Consequently, by virtue of the disbursements mailed to 
plaintiffs, defendants were allegedly able to delay discovery of 
their scheme to misappropriate an excessive share of the 
partnership's profits.  The scheme could not have continued 
unless the checks were delivered by one means or another.  As 
long as the method of delivery was through the United States 
Postal Service, defendants' alleged scheme satisfied the elements 
of the federal offense of mail fraud.  
 
  
satisfy continuity requirement); Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755, 
759 (3d Cir. 1989) (fourteen month period of conduct may be 
sufficient to establish closed-ended continuity).  Accordingly, 
we find, from the strictly durational aspect of the scheme, that 
plaintiffs in the present case have made a sufficient showing to 
survive summary judgment on the "continuity" prong of the pattern 
analysis.   
 The Supreme Court cautions us, however, in H.J. Inc., 
that the existence of continuity may not always be apparent.  492 
U.S. at 243.  For example, the statutory definition of pattern is 
"at least two acts of racketeering activity" within a ten year 
period.  18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).  It is clear that ten years is a 
period of long duration.   Yet, would two related predicate acts, 
one committed in February 1982 and one committed in January 1992, 
be sufficient to form a pattern?  It would seem unlikely.  
Indeed, Justice White noted in a footnote that, while § 1961(5) 
defines a pattern of racketeering activity as requiring at least 
two acts of racketeering activity, two acts may not be 
sufficient.  Id. at 496 n.14.   
 The question remains, then, what more is required in 
order to evaluate whether continuity has been established when 
predicate acts have occurred over a period of several years.  One 
helpful consideration can be found in the Court's requirements 
for open-ended continuity.  In H.J. Inc. the Court states that 
open-ended continuity is established when the commission of the 
  
predicate acts is "a regular way of conducting defendant's 
ongoing legitimate business."  492 U.S. at 243.  It would seem a 
valid analogy that, if the predicate acts have been a regular way 
of conducting defendant's legitimate business over a long period 
in the past, the RICO pattern has been satisfied.19  In such a 
case, the relatedness and the frequency of the predicate acts 
would have created the pattern of racketeering activity.  From 
our review of the record in the present case, we find that the 
allegations made by plaintiffs concerning defendants' manner of 
doing business over this period satisfy such a RICO continuity 
requirement.20   
                     
    
19In making this analogy, we in no way imply that the 
predicate acts must constitute a "regular way" of a defendant's 
doing business.  We merely give one example of the manner in 
which "pattern" may be demonstrated. 
    
20The district court, in granting summary judgment to 
defendants, found that "[t]his is not a case where the predicate 
acts are 'part of an entity's regular way of doing business,' 
such as would affect others doing business with the entity."  
App. at 1377. (citing H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242).  See supra at 
page     [typescript at 16]. 
 To the extent that the district court suggests that 
effects upon others doing business with the entity are relevant 
to a finding of "continuity," we are not certain if the district 
court is requiring that those affected be outsiders doing 
business with the entity, as opposed to investors or partners in 
or beneficiaries of the entity.  If so, we find no support in 
H.J. Inc. for such a requirement.  The implication of the cited 
passage in H.J. Inc. does not limit its holding to require that 
the effect be on those who are doing business with the entity.   
 If, on the other hand, the district court was making a 
finding of fact on the scope of the defendants' regular way of 
doing business, i.e., that the alleged scheme to defraud the 
Estate and its beneficiaries, through the repeated actions 
described by Price Waterhouse, did not constitute defendants' 
regular way of doing business, then in view of the facts of 
  
 Moreover, even if we were not to have found that 
conduct lasting three and one-half years was sufficient to 
establish closed-ended continuity, we conclude that continuity 
still would have been established for the purposes of summary 
judgment in the present case under an "open-ended" continuity 
analysis.  Under H.J. Inc., if a RICO action is brought before a 
plaintiff can establish long-term criminal conduct, the 
"continuity" prong may still be met if a plaintiff can prove a 
threat of continued racketeering activity.  Whether the predicate 
acts constitute a threat of continued racketeering activity 
depends on "the specific facts of each case," id. at 242, but 
H.J. Inc. suggests that open-ended continuity may be satisfied 
"where it is shown that the predicates are a regular way of 
conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate business . . . or of 
conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO 
'enterprise.'"  Id. at 243.   
 Mindful that Kehr Packages instructs us, in determining 
continuity, to focus on the mail fraud element of the underlying 
fraudulent activity as well as on the element of the mailings, we 
are persuaded that the evidence here meets the standard for open-
ended continuity.  Plaintiffs have presented evidence that 
defendants continuously took questionable expenses, which 
directly affected the partnership income available to the Estate.  
                                                                  
record, we must conclude that such a finding of fact is clearly 
erroneous. 
  
Both Price Waterhouse reports are replete with examples of 
expense charges taken by defendants for which there is not 
adequate documentation or explanation to substantiate an ordinary 
and necessary business purpose.  These included trips, meals, 
home services, cars, gasoline, insurance expenditures, and 
telephone bills.   
 At this stage of the litigation, we must view the facts 
in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the non-movants, i.e., 
that as a regular way of doing business, defendants were 
fraudulently misrepresenting expenditures to benefit themselves 
and to deprive the Estate and its beneficiaries of their 
legitimate share of the profits of Tabas Enterprises.  The 
evidence in the record is clear that these practices, defendants' 
regular way of doing business, continued even after plaintiffs' 
complaint was filed.  As a consequence, plaintiffs have 
established a threat of continuing fraudulent conduct as required 
under an "open-ended" continuity analysis. 
 Because we have found a pattern of racketeering 
activity in both the duration of and the on-going threat implicit 
in defendants' regular way of doing business, we will not go on 
to analyze this case under the six Barticheck factors.  The fact 
that we do not employ the Barticheck factors in our analysis here 
does not, however, mean that they might not be relevant in a 
different case in determining if continuity exists.  As the Court 
noted in H.J. Inc., in those cases where relatedness and 
  
continuity are in doubt, other factors should be examined to 
discern if there is a "pattern of racketeering activity" under 
RICO:   
The limits of the relationship and continuity concepts 
that combine to define a RICO pattern, and the precise 
methods by which relatedness and continuity or its 
threat may be proved, cannot be fixed in advance with 
such clarity that it will always be apparent whether in 
a particular case a "pattern of racketeering activity" 
exists.  
492 U.S. at 243.  It is helpful, therefore, when determining 
whether "relatedness" or "continuity" has been proven, to use a 
fact-oriented, case-by-case approach to determine whether there 
is a "pattern of racketeering activity."21  
                     
    
21Although we decided Barticheck before H.J. Inc., we have 
since noted that the six Barticheck factors are still relevant in 
determining whether a pattern exists.  See Hindes v. Castle, 937 
F.2d 868, 873 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[T]he Barticheck factors, such 
as the number of acts, victims, and perpetrators and the 
character of the unlawful activity, may be relevant in some cases 
in assessing the threat of continuing criminal conduct by 
throwing light on whether the illegal activity was part of a 
legitimate business' regular way of conducting business, or 
whether the predicates were attributable to a 'long-term 
association that exists for criminal purposes.'") (citation 
omitted).   
 It remains clear, however, that "duration is the sine 
qua non of continuity."  Hindes, 937 F.2d at 873.  For this 
reason, the Barticheck factors are best viewed as analytical 
tools available to courts when the issue of continuity cannot be 
clearly determined under either a closed- or open-ended analysis. 
 It should also be noted that the H.J. Inc. decision 
cites the Third Circuit's holding in Barticheck for two narrow 
propositions only:  (1) that continuity is both a closed- and 
open-ended concept, 492 U.S. at 238, and (2) that "scheme" is not 
a self-defining term, 492 U.S. at 241 n.3.  Nowhere in H.J. Inc. 
does the Supreme Court expressly adopt the Barticheck factors as 
being required elements in the "continuity" analysis.   
  
  In the present case, we find that plaintiffs have 
clearly presented evidence that is legally sufficient to survive 
summary judgment on the issue of continuity through the 
defendants' alleged commission of the predicate acts and of the 
underlying fraudulent activity as an ongoing way of doing 
business.  Accordingly, we do not need to concern ourselves with 
the applicability of the Barticheck factors to the specific facts 
of this case.   
 We recognize that our ruling means that RICO, with its 
severe penalties, may be applicable to many "garden-variety" 
fraud cases, see Marshall-Silver, 894 F.2d at 597, particularly 
considering the judiciary's broad interpretation of the mail 
fraud statute.  See Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1413-14.  We are 
bound, however, by the language of RICO itself and the Supreme 
Court's instruction that "RICO is to be read broadly."  Sedima, 
473 U.S. at 497.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently 
struck down efforts by the courts of appeals to narrow RICO's 
scope.  See NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 (1994) 
(rejecting Seventh Circuit holding that RICO requires proof that 
either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of 
racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose); H.J. Inc., 
492 U.S. at 250 (rejecting Eighth Circuit holding that RICO 
requires proof of multiple "schemes"); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495 
(rejecting Second Circuit holding that RICO requires proof of 
  
prior conviction on predicate act and that plaintiff must 
demonstrate specific "racketeering injury").   
 We share the Supreme Court's concern over the broad 
application of the civil RICO statute.  We are nonetheless bound 
by the language of the statute and the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of it.  Accordingly, it is for Congress to decide 
whether to narrow the scope of RICO; we are not in a position to 
do so by requiring that parties prove elements of a threat or of 
an injury, presented by predicate racketeering activity, beyond 
what is expressed in the language of the statute itself.22 
 V. 
 Defendants have raised a number of alternative grounds 
for summary judgment claiming that insufficient causation and 
injury have been pleaded and that some of the defendants are not 
                     
    
22The dissent relies upon our recent holding in Jordan v. 
Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994) 
for the proposition that civil RICO should not be applicable in 
cases lacking a significant societal threat.  But see footnote 17 
in regard to our position that there is no requirement in civil 
RICO that the predicate acts pose a  "societal threat."  We find 
several significant differences, however, between Jordan and the 
dispute here.  First, the duration and continuing nature of the 
underlying fraudulent activity alleged here is much greater.  In 
addition, the district court in Jordan questioned the 
"relatedness" of the predicate acts, see Jordan v. Berman, 792 F. 
Supp. 380, 385-86 (E.D. Pa. 1992), and further held that 
plaintiffs had failed to establish that they had sustained any 
injury from the purported predicate acts.  Id. at 388.  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, the district court in Jordan found 
that there was no evidence presented that would lead a jury to 
believe that mail fraud had been committed.  Id. at 387.  As 
discussed above, we have come to a different conclusion in the 
present dispute. 
  
potentially liable under RICO.  Because discovery has not been 
completed, we find that it would be premature to address these 
alternative grounds.  Plaintiffs have sought to take additional 
depositions that could have substantial bearing upon these 
issues.  Additionally, the district court did not rule on any of 
the alternative grounds, and, as a consequence, it would be 
inappropriate for us to consider them at this stage.23 
 VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's decision granting summary judgment against plaintiffs on 
their RICO claims, we will vacate the dismissal of plaintiffs' 
supplemental state claim, and we will remand this case to the 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.24 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge, Concurring. 
 I 
 I join in almost all of Judge Roth's lead opinion 
(including Parts I, II, V, and VI in their entirety), and I 
                     
    
23We note that on remand the court should consider whether 
the decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993) 
has any bearing on this case.  In Reves, the Supreme Court held 
that only defendants who participate in the operation or 
management of an enterprise can be held liable for violating 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
    
24In view of our vacatur of the dismissal of plaintiffs' 
supplemental state claims, we do not need to rule on defendants' 
cross-appeal. 
  
concur in the judgment.  I write separately, however, because I 
believe that the opinion has "stopped short," and not carried the 
logic of its argument to its ultimate conclusion.  More 
specifically, while Judge Roth's opinion makes clear that the 
"Barticheck factors" cannot be the sine qua non of the continuity 
determination, and its opinion undoubtedly erodes Barticheck's 
precedential value, the court's logic -- as Judge Greenberg's 
dissent recognizes, see Dissenting Op. at page 7, especially 
lines 6-10 -- compels the conclusion that Barticheck should be 
abandoned.  Yet Judge Roth leaves it breathing and thereby will, 
I fear, cause mischief by engendering confusion in the district 
courts, in addition to a round of further appeals. 
 I recognize that Judge Roth's opinion does not in terms 
rest on application of the six Barticheck factors.  It is a fact, 
however, that these factors have been at the heart of this 
court's civil RICO jurisprudence for the past seven years, and 
most district court opinions struggling with the existence vel 
non of civil RICO continuity use Barticheck as their polestar.  
In my view, now that we are in banc on a civil RICO case, it is 
incumbent upon us to clarify the status of Barticheck, and the 
lead opinion's avoidance of the issue is not grounds for putting 
it off to another day.  I therefore write separately in order to 
set forth my understanding of the implications of this court's 
decision. 
 
  
 II 
 Perhaps the most serious example of the uncertainty 
needlessly sown by the jurisprudential reticence of Judge Roth's 
opinion concerns Barticheck factor #6, the "character of the 
unlawful activity."  In my view, the opinion can be read as 
leaving open the possibility that this factor, along with the 
other Barticheck factors, survives today's decision.  See Lead 
Op. at page 40 ("The fact that we do not employ the Barticheck 
factors in our analysis here does not, however, mean that they 
might not be relevant in a different case in determining if 
continuity exists.") (emphasis supplied); id. at 41 n.21 ("The 
Barticheck factors . . . may be relevant in some cases in 
assessing the threat of continuing criminal conduct . . . .") 
(internal quotation marks omitted, emphases supplied).  This is 
apparently the conclusion drawn by Judge Greenberg, whose dissent 
treats "character of the unlawful activity" as the most important 
of the factors.  See Dissenting Op. at pages 12, 15.  But Judge 
Roth's opinion does not explain how to distinguish this factor 
from "societal threat," which, she properly holds (if less 
emphatically than is warranted), cannot survive Sedima and H.J., 
Inc.  See Lead Op. at page 34 n.17. 
 This reluctance to overrule Barticheck thus has the 
unfortunate potential for contributing to doctrinal confusion, 
for as Judge Greenberg argues in dissent, see Dissenting Op. at 
page 7, a given factor either is or is not relevant to the 
  
existence of a "pattern" of racketeering activity.  The RICO 
statute does not have one provision for cases where relatedness 
and continuity (or their absence) are clear and another for 
"those cases where relatedness and continuity are in doubt."  
Lead Op. at page 40.  Accordingly, I believe that we should inter 
Barticheck as a whole, and should forthrightly announce which, if 
any, Barticheck factors remain relevant to the continuity 
analysis and which do not. 
 A. 
 As I read Judge Roth's opinion, it properly treats the 
length of time over which the predicate acts were committed 
(Barticheck factor #2), the number of unlawful acts (factor #1), 
and the routineness or customariness of the acts (which in my 
view is, as I explain below, the only permissible interpretation 
of factor #6, the character of the unlawful activity) as relevant 
for the continuity inquiry.  Although Judge Roth does not discuss 
Barticheck factors #3-#5 (similarity of acts, number of victims, 
and number of perpetrators), I believe that its analysis shows 
that these factors are irrelevant to the continuity inquiry. 
 As Judge Roth notes, continuity is "centrally a 
temporal concept."  Lead Op. at page 31 (quoting H.J., Inc., 492 
U.S. at 242).  It simply "refer[s] either to a closed period of 
repeated conduct [closed-ended continuity], or to past conduct 
that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of 
repetition [open-ended continuity]."  Id. (quoting H.J., Inc., 
  
492 U.S. at 241) (alterations supplied here).  Thus duration, 
whether established duration or likely duration, is central to 
the "continuity" aspect of a RICO "pattern."  As a result, the 
length of time over which the predicate acts occurred (Barticheck 
factor #2) is of primary significance. 
 I agree with Judge Roth's view that something more is 
needed to make out a "pattern," and that two related predicate 
acts almost ten years apart are unlikely to suffice.  See Lead 
Op. at page 37.  But the number of predicate acts (Barticheck 
factor #1), on which her opinion properly relies in finding 
continuity here, provides all that is needed for closed-ended 
continuity.  In conjunction with duration, the number of acts 
suffices to show frequency -- a concept that, as Judge Roth's 
opinion agrees, see Lead Op. at 6, provides an adequate 
interpretation of "pattern" where completed, related acts are 
concerned. 
 As the Supreme Court has explained, the definition of a 
RICO "pattern" should accord with the plain meaning of that term.  
In particular, 
 [a] "pattern" is an "arrangement or order of things or 
activity," and the mere fact that there are a number of 
predicates is no guarantee that they fall into any 
arrangement or order.  It is not the number of 
predicates but the relationship that they bear to each 
other or to some external organizing principle that 
renders them "ordered" or "arranged." 
H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 238, 109 S. Ct. at 2900 (citation 
omitted). 
  
 As I see it, the continuity prong of pattern analysis 
should be explicitly directed toward ruling out RICO liability 
premised on two or more predicate acts that are related but 
nonetheless "isolated" or "sporadic."  See H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. 
at 239, 109 S. Ct. at 2900 (discussing legislative history of the 
"pattern" requirement).  Courts then would be in a better 
position to engage in reasonably meaningful discussions of 
whether -- in the concrete circumstances of the case -- 
continuing racketeering activity had been adequately alleged. 
 But the Barticheck factors fail to provide the needed 
guidance, and any attempt to use all six in continuity analysis, 
in my view, is destined for failure, in part because these 
factors were not originally intended to govern the continuity 
inquiry.  Rather, they originated as an attempt to distill our 
case law on the RICO pattern requirement, simpliciter, not as an 
explication of separate relatedness and continuity requirements.  
See Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 38-39 ("Those cases . . . recognized 
that the existence of a RICO pattern . . . turn[s] on . . . " a 
combination of specific factors . . . .") (emphasis supplied).  
Some of the Barticheck factors are relevant to this general 
notion of pattern.25  Once "pattern" is analytically severed into 
"relatedness" and "continuity," however, there is no reason to 
                     
    
25I do not mean to suggest that the number of perpetrators or 
victims, while irrelevant to continuity, is relevant to 
relatedness, for it is not.  The identity or other defining 
characteristics of the victims and perpetrators, however, may 
help establish relatedness of predicate acts. 
  
insist that all six of the factors will logically bear on both 
continuity and relatedness.  Barticheck did not do so.  Rather, 
it discussed the various factors and concluded simply that the 
plaintiffs had adequately alleged a RICO pattern.  See id. at 39. 
 What Barticheck did do, however, was recognize that 
continuity might be either open-ended or closed-ended, rejecting 
the defendants' argument that RICO reached only conduct that was 
potentially ongoing.  See id. at 39-40.  Furthermore -- and this 
accords with my view that the factors should be analyzed as they 
bear on screening out isolated or sporadic activity -- the 
Barticheck panel said that the "continuity" language in the 
legislative history cited in Sedima 
 simply call[ed] for an inquiry into the extent of the 
racketeering activity.  Although temporal open-
endedness may be one measure of extent, it is not the 
only one.  We decline to adopt a verbal formula for 
determining when unlawful activity is sufficiently 
extensive to be "continuous." 
832 F.2d at 40.  I would explicitly hold, therefore, that 
although the duration of the predicate acts does not without more 
show continuity, if the acts occurred (as shown by the number of 
acts) or establish a threat of occurring (as shown by also 
considering whether they are repetitive in nature) with some 
frequency, they satisfy the continuity requirement, and, provided 
they are related, a pattern is shown. 
 "A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate 
continuity over a closed period by proving a series of related 
predicates extending over a substantial period of time."  H.J., 
  
Inc., 492 U.S. at 242, 109 S. Ct. at 2902.  What constitutes a 
"substantial" period of time for these purposes (as long as in 
excess of "a few weeks or months," see infra) should vary with 
the number of acts in "the series" of predicates.  As the number 
of acts in a given period of time increases, the predicates begin 
to look less sporadic and a pattern begins to emerge.  The only 
(relative) absolute here should be that the predicates must 
stretch out at least for more than three or four months to 
establish closed-ended continuity in light of the Court's 
instruction that "[p]redicate acts extending over a few weeks or 
months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy" 
the continuity requirement.  Id. at 242, 109 S. Ct. at 2902. 
 For open-ended continuity, in contrast, we are looking 
for "conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a 
threat of repetition."  Thus, while I agree with Judge Roth that 
the two types of continuity are cognate, I believe that to see 
whether open-ended continuity is established, what we should ask 
is simply whether the activity threatens to demonstrate close-
ended continuity at some future time.  This, I believe, is the 
point of the three examples of open-ended continuity in the H.J., 
Inc. opinion, including the scenario where the defendant's 
commission of predicate acts is "a regular way of conducting 
defendant's ongoing legitimate business."  492 U.S. at 242-43, 
109 S. Ct. at 2902. 
  
 To return to Barticheck factor #6, in my view, threat 
of recurrence is also the only respect in which the "character" 
of the predicate acts is relevant to the continuity inquiry.  As 
the Supreme Court and Judge Roth's opinion have explained, open-
ended continuity merely refers to "past conduct that by its 
nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition."  
Majority Op. at page 31 (quoting H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 241, 109 
S. Ct. at 2902) (emphasis supplied here).  For example, if 
extortion is a defendant's regular way of conducting business, 
then the nature or character of the conduct in the sense of its 
routineness or literal open-endedness makes it likely to continue 
into the future.  That is the sense in which the character of the 
activity is relevant to continuity.26 
 As Judge Roth's opinion correctly holds, "character of 
the unlawful activity" may not refer to some notion of "societal 
threat."  Lead Op. at page 34 n.17.  Because the opinion does not 
clarify the extremely limited sense in which "character" of the 
                     
    
26This interpretation of "character" of the unlawful activity 
as "repetitive character" also makes sense of the admonition in 
Kehr Packages to consider the underlying scheme in mail fraud 
cases.  To the extent that the underlying scheme indicates a 
likelihood of a defendant's continuing to commit predicate acts, 
it may be relevant to open-ended continuity.  (Of course, the 
underlying scheme also may supply an "organizing principle" that 
establishes relatedness.  See supra at page 50 (quoting H.J., 
Inc. 492 U.S. at 238, 109 S. Ct. at 2900).)  In all cases, 
however, we are looking for a pattern (and thus continuity and 
relatedness) of the predicate acts of racketeering activity, see 
H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 237-40, 109 S. Ct. at 2900-01; id. at 
242, 109 S. Ct. at 2902. 
  
predicate acts is relevant to the continuity inquiry, the dissent 
unfortunately devotes great energy to arguing that the 
"character" of the predicate acts, meaning the species of act 
involved, weighs against a finding of continuity.  See Dissenting 
Op. at pages 12-18.  I believe that this effort is fundamentally 
at odds with the RICO statute and Supreme Court precedent 
interpreting it. 
 B. 
 The "societal threat" requirement can be traced back to 
this court's opinion in the first Marshall-Silver case, 835 F.2d 
63 (3d Cir. 1987).  There, we reasoned that "the target of RICO 
. . . is criminal activity that, because of its organization, 
duration, and objectives poses, or during its existence posed, a 
threat of a series of injuries over a significant period of 
time."  Id. at 66-67 (emphases supplied).  The panel dismissed 
the case in part because it involved "a single victim, a single 
injury, and a single short-lived scheme with only two active 
perpetrators," id. at 67, and thus did not pose the appropriate 
sort of threat.  This was an eminently prudent attempt to make 
sense of the RICO pattern requirement.  It appears to be an 
effort to get at the ongoing or potentially ongoing criminal 
activity that concerned Congress.  It was essentially an extent 
requirement. 
 In the cases after H.J., Inc., however, the concern 
over extent of injury was transmogrified to a focus on societal 
  
injury.  Rather than worry about a "series of injuries," we have 
come to focus on a normative evaluation of the injuries alleged 
in a civil RICO case.  Such focus is the basis for Judge 
Greenberg's dissent in this case, but with all due respect, given 
what Congress and the Supreme Court have said about the RICO 
statute, see Lead Op. at page 34 n.17, I believe that the focus 
is inappropriate in this context. 
 Congress in the RICO statute specified an extensive 
laundry list of serious and arguably less serious acts that all 
constitute racketeering activity, and so it strikes me as 
improper to maintain that the statute's "pattern" requirement 
builds in a normative evaluation of the seriousness of the 
predicate acts.  The concern about federalizing and attaching 
drastic penalties to "garden variety fraud," see Dissenting Op. 
at pages 20-21, is a legitimate one, but one that must be 
addressed by Congress rather than the courts.  And Congress has 
told us what sorts of acts to worry about.  Our concern with the 
pattern requirement is simply to insure that RICO liability is 
not attached to "isolated" or "sporadic" predicate acts.  That 
task requires no inquiry into the seriousness of the acts.  The 
"threat" for which we are looking is the threat of repeated 
prohibited conduct, not the threat of grievous harm. 
 With this in mind, I believe that this court should 
plainly state that the number of victims (factor #4) and number 
of perpetrators (factor #5) do not bear on the continuity 
  
inquiry.  Certainly, neither the number of victims nor the number 
of perpetrators should affect the analysis of duration which, as 
the majority explains, the Supreme Court has rendered the 
centerpiece of the continuity jurisprudence.  Indeed, these 
factors seem to inform the notion of societal threat, and hence 
are out of bounds. 
 Nor does the number of victims or perpetrators go to 
making out a pattern.  For example, one office-tower bomb 
triggered during business hours could result in a tragically 
large number of victims, but just because the bombing happened 
during the day instead of at night when few people were there 
does not make it more likely that the bombing reflects non-
isolated or non-sporadic activity.  Similarly, three bombings by 
several conspirators trying to eliminate one target would not (if 
successful) reflect a greater threat of continuing racketeering 
activity than would three bombings by the Unabomber, because it 
is only the repetitive nature of the activity and not the number 
of victims or perpetrators that helps establish a threat of 
continuity. 
 The number of predicate acts could indicate an extent 
of activity that would bear on whether the activity is sporadic 
or frequent, and extent of the predicate activity is therefore 
relevant to continuity, as Judge Roth seems to recognize.  See 
Lead Op. at page 38 ("[If] the predicate acts have been a regular 
way of conducting defendant's legitimate business over a long 
  
period in the past, the RICO pattern been satisfied.").  But 
number of victims is not relevant, for, under the present 
congressional scheme, we are looking for continuity in order to 
show a pattern of racketeering acts, not harm from the acts.  See 
supra page 54 n.26. 
 C. 
 We have previously held that "similarity" (factor #3) 
does not bear on continuity, see, e.g., Marshall-Silver, 894 F.2d 
at 595 n.1, and Judge Roth has already made length of time 
(factor #2) and number of unlawful acts (factor #1) part of her 
core analysis, irrespective of Barticheck.  In my view, the lead 
opinion leaves virtually nothing of Barticheck and I believe -- 
along with Judge Greenberg in dissent, see Dissenting Op. at page 
7, especially lines 6-10 -- that we should say so.  While I share 
Judge Roth's uneasiness as to where this leaves the law, I can 
only hope that its eloquent and clarion call will not be ignored 
by Congress. 
 Judges Stapleton and McKee join in this concurrence. 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 I concur in the judgment, and I join parts I, II, V, 
and VI of the opinion of the court  While the discussion of the 
"continuity" requirement in part IV of Judge Roth's opinion is a 
welcome step away from the approach taken in some of this court's 
prior decisions, I do not agree with certain portions of that 
  
discussion.  I set out my understanding of the concept of 
"continuity" in Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 
1406, 1419-26 (3d Cir. 1991) (Alito, J., concurring and 
dissenting), and pursuant to that analysis, I think that closed- 
ended continuity was sufficiently established here to defeat 
summary judgment.  My principal points of disagreement with the 
discussion in part IV of Judge Roth's opinion are as follows. 
 First, I do not agree with the intimation (Typescript 
at 34) that closed-ended continuity requires activity lasting 
years.  See Kehr Packages, Inc., 926 F.2d at 1421-22 (Alito, J., 
concurring and dissenting).  
 Second, I do not agree with the suggestion (Typescript 
at 36-37) that a plaintiff who establishes "closed-ended 
continuity" may also be required to show that the predicate acts 
were part of the defendant's regular way of conducting its 
business.  I see no support for this requirement in the language 
of the RICO statute or relevant Supreme Court decisions. 
 Third, I do not agree that, in a RICO case based on 
mail fraud predicates, we must "focus on the underlying 
fraudulent activity, rather that on the otherwise innocent 
mailings, in determining continuity."  (Typescript at 38.)  In my 
view, we must focus on the duration of the predicate violations.  
See Kehr Packages, Inc., 926 F.2d at 1422-23 (Alito, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
  
 Finally, I do not think that the Barticheck factors 
should be considered except to the extent that they have some 
logical bearing on "relatedness" or "continuity."  See Kehr 
Packages, 926 F.2d at 1421 (Alito, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
  
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 In its amended complaint, the Estate of Charles L. 
Tabas seeks to transform its state-law dispute with the 
defendants over the proper allocation of a partnership's profits 
into a federal RICO case simply by alleging that the defendants 
used the United States mail to communicate with it over a 
substantial period of time.  While we have not considered 
directly whether a plaintiff can bring a RICO action in such 
circumstances, our precedents clearly forbid such alchemy.  See 
Hughes v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 609-11 (3d 
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1222, 112 S.Ct. 2300 (1992); 
Hindes v. Castle, 937 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1991); Kehr Packages, 
Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
111 S.Ct. 2839 (1991); Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 
1990); Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Swistock v. Jones, 884 F.2d 755 (3d Cir. 1989).  
Therefore, I would affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants, and I respectfully dissent.27   
 I agree with the majority that the central issue in 
this appeal is whether the Estate has alleged that the defendants 
engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity" as defined in 18 
                     
    
27The Estate may have valid claims under state law, but I 
would hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in dismissing these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
  
U.S.C. § 1961(5).28  Majority typescript at 24.  As noted by the 
majority, to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, a 
plaintiff "must show that the racketeering predicates are 
related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued 
criminal activity."  H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 
U.S. 229, 239, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2900 (1989) (emphasis in 
original).  Thus, a plaintiff seeking to bring a RICO claim must 
allege, among other things, relatedness and continuity. 
 As the majority states, the predicate acts are 41 
instances of alleged mail fraud.  Of these, 39 were the mailing 
of $15,000 checks to the Estate, totalling $585,000, representing 
monthly distributions from Tabas Enterprises.  The remaining two 
were the mailing of yearly tax forms to the Estate.  Amended 
Complaint ¶ 49, App. at 43-46.  According to the amended 
complaint, the checks were sent from December 22, 1987, to 
February 19, 1991, a period of over three years.29  The Estate 
also alleges as predicate acts that the defendants used the 
United States mail to send checks to members of Daniel Tabas's 
family for work not performed.  Amended Complaint ¶ 51, App. at 
                     
    
28I also agree with the majority that the 1987 settlement and 
the subsequent mutual release do not preclude the Estate from 
bringing this case.  I mention this point because, as the 
majority notes, this issue was considered by the panel only and I 
was a member of the panel. 
    
29The amended complaint recites that the last two checks were 
sent on January 18, 1990, and February 19, 1990.  Amended 
Complaint at 34.  However, these dates appear to be typographical 
errors because they are listed in an otherwise chronological 
sequence in which the next preceding date was December 14, 1990. 
  
46-47.30  The majority, however, does not rely on these 
allegations as the Estate did not provide evidence that these 
checks were mailed, and the evidence on the motion for summary 
judgment established that a courier delivered them.  I agree with 
this disposition and thus conclude that we are concerned only 
with the mailing of the $15,000 checks and the tax forms. 
 I would hold that these mailings are related.31  See 
Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1414 (noting that relatedness test 
almost always will be satisfied "in cases alleging at least two 
acts of mail fraud stemming from the same fraudulent 
transaction").  However, in my view these mailings do not satisfy 
the continuity requirement as defined by the Supreme Court's and 
our precedents.  In H.J. Inc., the Supreme Court stated that 
continuity "is both a closed- and open-ended concept, referring 
either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct 
that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of 
repetition."  492 U.S. at 241, 109 S.Ct. at 2902 (citing 
Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F.2d 36, 
                     
    
30In their brief, the defendants maintain that this 
allegation does not satisfy the pleading requirements of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 9(b).  Brief at 30 n.6; see Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d at 
422 n.1 (noting that allegations of mail fraud must be plead with 
specificity required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).  I do not address 
this contention because even assuming that the pleading 
requirement is met, the allegations were refuted and, in any 
event, the Estate's allegations as a whole do not state a claim 
under RICO. 
    
31While the majority does not hold explicitly that they are 
related, it implicitly reaches this conclusion. 
  
39 (3d Cir. 1987)).  If a plaintiff does not allege that the 
predicate acts lasted over a "substantial period of time," then 
it must allege a threat of continued criminal activity.  Id. at 
242, 109 S.Ct. at 2902; Marshall-Silver, 894 F.2d at 596.  
Conversely, if a plaintiff alleges that the predicate acts lasted 
a substantial period of time, then it need not allege a threat of 
future criminal conduct.  Therefore, a plaintiff alleging a 
closed-ended scheme has both a lesser burden in that it does not 
have to demonstrate a threat of future harm, and a greater burden 
in that it must establish that the predicate acts continued over 
a substantial period of time. 
 Although we do not have a bright-line rule establishing 
how long the predicate acts must last to constitute a 
"substantial period of time," I will assume that the period of 
over three years in this case would satisfy any such 
definition.32  Yet, simply by clearing this duration hurdle the 
Estate does not establish continuity for we have stated clearly 
and repeatedly that duration is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to proving continuity.  In Hindes v. Castle, for 
example, we stated: 
 The post-H.J. Inc. cases decided by this 
court which have focused on pattern all make 
clear that duration is the sine qua non of 
continuity.  While it is not in itself 
sufficient to establish a pattern, a 
determination that must be made in light of 
                     
    
32While I treat this case as a closed-ended case, obviously 
if I considered it as open-ended my result would be the same. 
  
all of the Barticheck factors, no pattern can 
be shown without the required duration. 
937 F.2d at 873 (emphasis added).  Likewise, in Marshall-Silver 
we recognized: 
 [I]f the Court in H.J. Inc. intended that the 
duration of the predicate acts or the threat 
arising therefrom should be determinative  
 . . . we would not have expected the Court to 
eschew providing a specific standard in favor 
of a fact oriented, case-by-case development. 
894 F.2d at 597 (emphasis in original) (dicta); see also Kehr 
Packages, 926 F.2d at 1412 (noting that "the length of time over 
which the criminal activity occurs or threatens to occur is an 
important factor," but not stating that it is dispositive).  
Accordingly, a more detailed analysis of the complaint is 
required.33 
                     
    
33Our rule that duration is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to establish continuity is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's statement in H.J. Inc.: "petitioners claim that the 
racketeering predicates occurred with some frequency over at 
least a 6-year period, which may be sufficient to satisfy the 
continuity requirement."  492 U.S. at 250, 109 S.Ct. at 2906 
(emphasis added).  By using the word "may," the Court implicitly 
rejected the notion that duration alone establishes continuity.   
 
 Precedents in other circuits could be read to suggest 
that duration alone can satisfy continuity.  See, e.g., Dana 
Corp. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mutual, 900 F.2d 882, 886-87 
(6th Cir. 1990) (stating that in a single-scheme, single-victim 
case "the allegations of fraud occurring for a period of 
seventeen years, along with the specific mailings evidencing such 
a scheme, are sufficient to state a claim of a pattern of 
racketeering activity"); Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 893 F.2d 
441, 446-47 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that 95 fraudulent mailings 
sent over a four and one-half year period are sufficient to 
establish continuity); Walk v. Baltimore & Ohio & R., 890 F.2d 
688, 690 (4th Cir. 1989) (reversing dismissal where complaint 
alleged 10-year scheme to defraud plaintiffs); Jacobson v. 
  
 In Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 
832 F.2d 36, we set forth six factors that a court should address 
in considering whether the plaintiff has alleged a pattern of 
racketeering:  (1) the number of unlawful acts; (2) the length of 
time over which the acts were committed (duration); (3) the 
similarity of the acts; (4) the number of the victims; (5) the 
number of perpetrators; and (6) the character of the unlawful 
activity.  Id. at 39.  The majority nevertheless concludes that 
having "found a pattern of racketeering activity in both the 
duration of and the on-going threat implicit in defendants' 
regular way of doing business [it] will not go on to analyze this 
case under the six Barticheck factors."  Majority typescript at 
40.  The majority then indicates that its decision not to employ 
the Barticheck factors does not mean that they are irrelevant in 
determining where there is continuity, as a court may consider 
the factors if relatedness and continuity are in doubt.   
                                                                  
Cooper, 882 F.2d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that continuity 
existed because predicate acts alleged occurred over "a matter of 
years").  However, it is not clear that in any of these cases, 
the courts of appeals faced a factual situation analogous to the 
one presented here, i.e., a dispute over the profits of a 
partnership.  This case most similar to this one is Jacobson.  In 
Jacobson, the plaintiff alleged that the two defendants, one of 
which was his son, attempted to defraud him out of real estate 
holdings that he owned.  While the nature of the dispute is 
somewhat similar, the alleged predicate acts went beyond mail 
fraud and included extortion, larceny, offering false instruments 
for filing, and usury.  882 F.2d at 719.  Thus, the character of 
the unlawful activity in Jacobson is vastly different than that 
alleged here.  In any event, we are not bound by Jacobson. 
  
 I reject the majority's approach.  To start with, 
continuity is in doubt here.  But quite aside from that 
consideration it seems to me that the majority's approach 
inevitably leads to analytical looseness in determining whether 
there has been a pattern of racketeering activity.  While I do 
not doubt that in practice the Barticheck factors cannot be 
applied with mathematical precision, at least the factors are 
guidelines in determining whether the plaintiff has demonstrated 
continuity and relatedness.   
 The majority opinion would be more justifiable if it 
were to say that after H.J., Inc., the earlier explicated 
Bartichek factors are no longer relevant in any continuity 
analysis.  While I would disagree with that holding, such a 
result would have some analytical consistency.  But by saying the 
Bartichek factors are relevant in some cases but not in others, 
see majority typescript at 40-41 & n.21, the majority winds up 
saying that the Bartichek factors -- which are designed to answer 
the broader question of whether particular facts fairly can be 
characterized as a RICO case -- may shed light on whether a 
three-month long scheme constitutes a pattern of racketeering 
activity but not on whether a three-year long scheme constitutes 
such a pattern.  It seems to me self-evident that there are 
three-month long schemes that clearly fall within RICO's purview 
and three-year schemes that clearly do not.  Thus, if the 
Bartichek factors are relevant at all, they are relevant in 
  
shedding light on all cases.  The majority's approach to the 
complex statute does injustice to the Supreme Court's admonitions 
to courts to take a "flexible approach" when interpreting the 
"continuity" prong of the statute and to develop the concepts 
behind "pattern of racketeering activity" on a case by case 
basis.  See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238, 243, 109 S.Ct. at 2900, 
2902-03.  See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 
500, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3287 (1985) (Congress "and the courts" 
should "develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.'") (emphasis 
added).       
 Of course, as I have indicated, we decided Barticheck 
before the Supreme Court's decision in H.J. Inc.  Nevertheless, 
we have noted in post-H.J. Inc. cases that the Barticheck factors 
are still relevant and must be considered "'as they bear upon the 
separate questions of continuity and relatedness.'"  Hindes, 937 
F.2d at 873 (quoting Banks, 918 F.2d at 423); accord Midwest 
Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1023-25 (7th Cir. 
1992) (noting that factors set forth in Morgan v. Bank of 
Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986), which are similar to 
Barticheck factors, apply even after H.J. Inc.).  In Marshall-
Silver, we recognized that all of the Barticheck factors except 
the third, the similarity of criminal acts, are relevant to the 
question of continuity.  894 F.2d at 595 n.1; see also Hindes, 
937 F.2d at 873 (reaffirming this view).  Thus, the question of 
continuity is an "'inquiry into the extent of the [defendant's] 
  
racketeering activity,'" Marshall-Silver, 894 F.2d at 595 
(quoting Barticheck, 822 F.2d at 40), and requires an examination 
of the five Barticheck factors relevant to continuity.  Moreover, 
in applying these factors, we must take a "natural and common 
sense approach" to continuity.  H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237, 109 
S.Ct. at 2899.  In view of these precedents in which so many of 
the judges of this court have joined, I am perplexed at the 
majority's subordination of Barticheck.   
 Inasmuch as I would apply Barticheck in this case I 
will now make an analysis of the factors it set forth.  The first 
factor, the number of unlawful acts, might appear to weigh in 
favor of continuity as the Estate alleged that the defendants 
engaged in over 40 predicate acts.  However, as we stated in Kehr 
Packages, "the continuity question should not be affected by the 
fact that a particular fraudulent scheme involved numerous 
otherwise 'innocent' mailings, rather than only a few."  926 F.2d 
at 1414.  Rather, what needs to be considered is the underlying 
scheme:  "Although the mailing is the actual criminal act, the 
instances of deceit constituting the underlying fraudulent scheme 
are more relevant to the continuity analysis."  Id.; see also 
Midwest Grinding Co., 976 F.2d at 1024 ("Although the sheer 
number of predicate acts might appear at first glance to prove 
continuity, when it comes to a pattern premised on acts of mail 
or wire fraud, the volume of mailings is not dispositive.").   
  
 In this case, the alleged underlying scheme was an 
attempt to defraud the Estate out of its rightful share of the 
partnership income.  Thus, the allegations of fraud relate to a 
discrete dispute, rather than to numerous distinct attempts to 
defraud.  To paraphrase Kehr Packages, "[i]t should not be 
relevant . . . that [the defendants] sent [checks] on a monthly 
basis, rather than quarterly or yearly."  926 F.2d at 1414.  
Thus, "the sizable number of mailings does not show that the 
defendants operated a long-term criminal operation."  Midwest 
Grinding Co., 976 F.2d at 1025.  Accordingly, this factor weighs 
against a finding of continuity. 
 The second factor is duration.  As I noted above, the 
alleged fraudulent activity lasted for at least three years.  
However, the significance of the length of the alleged scheme is 
diminished by the nature of the scheme itself.  In this regard, I 
reiterate that the defendants repeated the same allegedly 
fraudulent act over three years.  Thus, this is not a case in 
which each mailing constituted a new fraudulent act.  See Kehr 
Packages, 926 F.2d at 1415 (distinguishing Fleet Credit Corp. v. 
Sion, 893 F.2d 441 (lst Cir. 1990), because in Fleet Credit "each 
mailing constituted a new fraudulent act").  As we noted in 
Marshall-Silver: 
 Where such a fraudulent scheme inflicts or 
threatens only a single injury, we continue 
to doubt that Congress intended to make the 
availability of treble damages and augmented 
criminal sanctions dependent solely on 
whether the fraudulent scheme is well enough 
  
conceived to enjoy prompt success or requires 
pursuit for an extended period of time. 
894 F.2d at 597.  Therefore, while the second factor, duration, 
does weigh in favor of continuity, it is not a heavy weight on 
the scale.  I will not discuss the third factor, the similarity 
of the alleged criminal acts, as that factor concerns 
relatedness, which I have found in this case. 
  The fourth factor, number of victims, weighs against a 
finding of continuity for, as the district court correctly 
indicated, this is a single-victim case.  The Estate disputes 
this conclusion, contending that all six of the beneficiaries of 
the Estate are victims, including a charitable foundation that 
ultimately benefits hundreds, if not thousands, of people.  Brief 
at 27 n.18.  Yet, this argument is supported neither by the case 
law nor the amended complaint itself.  In Kehr Packages, we 
addressed an analogous situation and found that the only victim 
of the defendants' alleged criminal activity was the company and 
not its shareholders or its guarantors.  We reached this 
conclusion because "Kehr's individual shareholders and 
guarantors, and the holders of pledged collateral, were affected 
only indirectly."  926 F.2d at 1418-19; see also Hughes, 945 F.2d 
at 611 (noting that alleged scheme affected single victim, 
"albeit a class of victims," in rejecting RICO claim).  
Similarly, here the scheme affected the beneficiaries of the 
Estate only indirectly. 
  
 Additionally, throughout its amended complaint, the 
Estate maintains that the fraudulent conduct deprived it, the 
Estate, of its rightful share of the income.  Indeed, according 
to the 1964 Partnership Agreement, the deceased party's share of 
the income is payable to his estate, not to his heirs.  App. at 
155.  While it is true that the presence of only one victim, like 
the existence of only one scheme, does not necessarily preclude 
the finding of a RICO pattern, this fact clearly weighs against 
the finding of continuity.  See United States Textiles, Inc. v. 
Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1268 (7th Cir. 1990).  
Indeed, when there is only one victim and that victim is engaged 
in a business relationship with the defendant, the dispute 
between the parties may be nothing more than a civil controversy. 
 The fifth factor, the number of perpetrators, does 
appear to weigh in the Estate's favor.  The district court stated 
that there was only one perpetrator, "Daniel Tabas or individuals 
under his control."  Opin. at 8-9.  But this conclusion is 
inherently contradictory for even if the other perpetrators are 
under Daniel's control, they still existed.  In fact, the 
district court's description could be used to describe an 
organized crime family, yet clearly Congress meant RICO to cover 
organized crime.  Nonetheless, this error is not significant, for 
even if the number were as large as the Estate argues, the fact 
that more than one person was involved in a scheme to defraud 
that lasted a substantial period of time cannot without more 
  
establish continuity.  Indeed, in some ways this is the least 
important factor.  Cf. Wade v. Hopper, 993 F.2d 1246, 1251 (7th 
Cir.) (per curiam) (listing factors relevant for continuity 
determination similar to those listed in Barticheck but not 
including number of perpetrators), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 193 
(1993); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d at 975 (listing same 
factors in pre-H.J. Inc. case).  Thus, this factor does not place 
a heavy weight on the continuity side of the scale. 
 The final factor, the character of the unlawful 
activity, is perhaps most important in assuring that RICO is 
applied in a manner consistent with congressional intent.  
Congress aimed to prevent long-term criminal activity, but not to 
federalize every garden-variety claim of fraud.  "The concept of 
'continuity' plays an important constraining role in the 
operation of the RICO statute" by requiring a court to examine 
not only the "period of time over which the predicate acts 
occurred or . . . during which any threatened criminal activity 
would be likely to last," but also the character of the predicate 
acts and the extent of the injury generated by the acts.  
Marshall-Silver, 894 F.2d at 596-97.  In this case the character 
of the alleged acts of mail fraud and the confined extent of the 
injury weigh heavily against the Estate.  "Repeated mailings in 
furtherance of a single scheme to inflict one fraudulent injury 
may be no indication of the underlying fraud's continuity."  
  
Shields Enters., Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., 975 F.2d 1290, 1295 
(7th Cir. 1992).   
 As I already have noted, this case evolves from an 
ongoing dispute regarding the appropriate split of a 
partnership's profits.  The allegations of fraud do not pertain 
to how Tabas Enterprises conducts its business, but only to its 
internal functioning.  Moreover, unlike other conduct which can 
constitute racketeering activity, such as extortion, robbery, or 
murder, there is nothing inherently criminal in mailing a letter 
containing a check or a tax form.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).  
Indeed, the vast majority of mailings undoubtedly are lawful.  
Thus, in this case the mailings could be regarded as racketeering 
activity only by reference to matters beyond the letters and 
their contents. 
 
 The unreasonableness of regarding the mailing of the 
thirty-nine $15,000 checks as RICO predicate acts in this case is 
demonstrated by considering what would have happened if the 
defendants had delivered the checks rather than mailed them.  In 
that case, they could not have committed mail fraud and the 
Estate could not have pleaded a RICO case, as there would have 
been no predicate acts on which to base the complaint.  Rather 
than seeking threefold damages under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), 
the Estate would have been limited to a state law claim -- even 
though at bottom the unlawful activity in both that hypothetical 
  
case and this case involves conduct of precisely the same 
character.  I thus ask the following question: is it conceivable 
that Congress intended that RICO could be applied to a defendant 
who mails substantial payments to the plaintiff, but not to the 
same defendant if it delivers the payments?34  The question 
answers itself.  Thus, the fact that this case involves mail 
fraud rather than some other type of fraud is entirely 
fortuitous, and that fortuity should not result in a windfall to 
the plaintiffs.  But by ignoring the Bartichek factors, and 
therefore failing to inquire into the character of the unlawful 
activity, the majority endorses just that counterintuitive 
result. 
 I recognize that the complaint is rife with contentions 
that the defendants' activity defrauded the Estate out of its 
fair share of the partnership's income.  Yet the Estate does not 
allege that the defendants' conduct has ramifications outside the 
confines of the immediate dispute regarding the division of the 
partnership's profits.  Thus, the broader threat is minimal at 
most.  See Meade v. Meade, 1991 WL 243539, *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 
1991) ("This is a dispute between a small number of parties, and 
                     
    
34While the majority answers that Congress did intend to 
distinguish between mailings and hand deliveries as the former 
but not the latter could be mail fraud, this answer misses my 
point.  My point is that in considering the character of the 
unlawful acts in accordance with the sixth Barticheck factor, the 
use of the mails was purely fortuitous in this particular case 
and it was the alleged fraud and not how the checks were 
delivered which injured the Estate. 
  
neither directly affects nor has wider implications for a large 
number of people.  Actual and threatened societal injury is 
little, if any.  Finally, each alleged act of mail and wire fraud 
forms part of one, extended scheme, reinforcing the essentially 
isolated nature of the alleged racketeering activity."), 
reconsideration denied, 1992 WL 6929 (E.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd, 998 
F.2d 1004 (3d Cir. 1993) (table); Rumbaugh v. Chandler, 1991 WL 
169046, *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1991) (App. at 1893-900) ("This 
action does not concern an extensive criminal enterprise whose 
long-standing, repeated conduct has caused and will continue to 
cause a severe injury to the community.  Rather, it is a private 
dispute between two ex-partners that has continued over twelve 
years in various forms.").       
 I make one final but critical point with respect to the 
character of the unlawful activity in this case.  I focus on this 
point because I regard the character of the activity as the most 
significant Barticheck factor in this case.  As the majority 
points out, 39 of the predicate acts consist of the mailing of  
$15,000 checks to the Estate and the other two concern mailing 
tax forms.  Reliance on such predicate acts is problematic 
because the Estate is pleading in essence that the defendants 
committed "mail fraud" by sending it money.  I can conceive of 
cases in which a defendant's act of sending money may constitute 
fraud; perhaps, even, the defendants' activities (as alleged in 
this case) theoretically could be prosecuted under the mail fraud 
  
statute,35 although it must be remembered that "not every use of 
the mails . . . in connection with a scheme is punishable" as 
mail fraud.  United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795 (3d Cir. 1994), 
slip op. at 3 (3d Cir. Dec. 13, 1994).  But three undisputed 
facts belie the conclusion that this is therefore a RICO case.  
First, between March 1983 and September 1986, "Tabas Enterprises 
paid for various personal expenses incurred by Harriette [as well 
as] Daniel."  Majority typescript at 4.  Second, "[p]rior to 
Charles's death . . . the brothers appeared to have an 
arrangement under which Tabas Enterprises paid for many personal 
and business expenses."  Majority typescript at 4 n.2 (emphasis 
added).  Finally, as the majority indicates, plaintiffs 
acknowledge that as of the time of the state court lawsuit, "they 
believed Daniel was taking more than he was entitled to under the 
partnership agreement . . . They contend [only] that they did not 
know the extent to which they were being short-changed . . . ."  
Majority typescript at 5 n.3 (emphasis added).   
 These facts make difficult to accept the majority's 
conclusion that the "mailings [were] 'designed to lull [the 
Estate] into a false sense of security, postpone [its] ultimate 
complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension 
                     
    
35See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 714-15, 109 
S.Ct. 1443, 1450 (1989) ("To the extent that Schmuck would draw 
from these previous cases a general rule that routine mailings 
that are innocent in themselves cannot supply the mailing element 
of the mail fraud offense, he misapprehends this Court's 
precedents."). 
 
  
of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken 
place.'"  Majority typescript at 35 n.18 (citation omitted).  In 
any event, no matter how the Estate characterizes this case, and 
even if there were some fraudulent acts, this suit is first and 
last a dispute about how the partnership income should have been 
distributed.  Seen in this context, the mailing of the checks was 
so benign an act that it is a thin foundation on which to build 
the continuity element.  At bottom, regardless of the pejorative 
words which the Estate uses to characterize the defendants' 
conduct, this case involves a commercial dispute over a discrete 
issue, the amount due to the Estate in its monthly draws.  Such a 
dispute is simply not a RICO controversy.36 
 I recognize that the majority has listed numerous 
questionable expenses charged against Tabas Enterprises and I 
further acknowledge that the defendants may have state law 
liability for some of these expenses.  But it is important in 
considering this case to keep in mind that the incurring of these 
expenses is not the predicate criminal conduct charged in this 
case.  Rather, the predicate acts to establish RICO jurisdiction 
are the use of the mails to disburse checks and to distribute 
forms.  Overall, therefore, after consideration of the character 
                     
    
36Keeping in mind that this case is really about who gets to 
use the partnership income for what purpose, consider what would 
have happened if the defendants had paid nothing to the Estate 
over the three-year period in which they actually paid $585,000.  
The Estate would have gotten nothing and there would not be a 
RICO case. 
  
of the unlawful activity, together with the other relevant 
Barticheck factors, both qualitatively and quantitatively, I  
conclude that the Estate has failed to establish a genuine issue 
of material fact over continuity and that this case is yet 
another attempt by a plaintiff "to fit a square peg in a round 
hole by squeezing garden-variety business disputes into civil 
RICO actions."  Midwest Grounding Co., 976 F.2d at 1025. 
 In reaching my conclusions, I have taken particular 
note of our opinion in Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & 
Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994), which affirmed the district 
court's judgment granting certain of the defendants "summary 
judgment on the RICO claim against them for failure to show 
relatedness and continuity . . . essentially for the reasons 
given by the district court."  Id. at 1254.  The district court 
opinion is reported as Jordan v. Berman, 792 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. 
Pa. 1992).  Jordan is a complex case involving a controversy 
between tenants and a landlord, the details of which I need not 
discuss.  Germane here is the district court's conclusion that 
the plaintiffs had not adduced "evidence from which one could 
reasonably find a pattern of racketeering activity under 
prevailing case law."  Id. at 388.  The district court explained 
the basis for its decision as follows: 
  Few relationships in our society seem to 
engender more conflict than that of landlord 
and tenant.  The aggressive landlord and the 
disgruntled tenant have almost become 
stereotypical.  The instant case involves a 
typical landlord-tenant dispute about the 
construction of a lease and what sums or 
  
services the respective parties are entitled 
to.  Permitting trash to accumulate for a 
day, disrupting utility service for half a 
day and vigorously pursuing a plausible 
contract interpretation are generally not the 
kind of things from which RICO cases are 
made.  The actions of defendants and their 
agents, however characterized, do not pose 
the type of significant societal threat that 
RICO was designed to deter or penalize. 
 
Id. (emphasis added).  By affirming "essentially for the reasons 
given by the district court," we approved the foregoing 
statement, even though the case involved the use of the mails and 
thus, in theory, could have been a RICO case. 
 If we substituted the relationship between partners for 
the landlord-tenant relationship, the underscored language in the 
above quotation would describe this case.  Certainly the 
partnership relationship, like the landlord-tenant relationship, 
is a frequent source of disputes.  The dispute in this case, to 
quote from and to paraphrase Jordan v. Berman: 
 involves a typical [partnership] dispute 
about the construction of a [partnership 
agreement] and what sums . . . the respective 
parties are entitled to. . . .  The actions 
of defendants and their agents, however 
characterized, do not pose the type of 
significant societal threat that RICO was 
designed to deter or penalize. 
 
Thus, this case is no more a RICO case than was Jordan.    
 In coming to my conclusions I also have found it useful 
to consider United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 
1992), a case which the majority cites and on which the Estate 
relies.  Pelullo is a post-H.J. Inc. case in which we found that 
  
a RICO violation could be proved based on a closed-ended scheme 
that lasted 19 months.  In Pelullo, the defendant was a chief 
executive officer of The Royale Group, Ltd., a publicly held 
corporation which through subsidiaries acquired six hotels in 
Miami Beach.  In June 1984, the hotels obtained a $13.5 million 
loan from a subsidiary of American Savings and Loan Association.  
Under the terms of the loan, $6.2 million was to be used for 
renovation, with American retaining this portion and disbursing 
the funds as renovation costs were incurred.  To obtain a 
disbursement, Royale was required to submit draw requests which 
set forth a certified itemization of the costs. 
 The indictment charged Pelullo with three fraudulent 
schemes:  (1) defrauding American, Royale, and Royale's 
shareholders by submitting false documents in connection with 
certain draw requests; (2) defrauding Royale of $114,000 by 
diverting cash from one of its subsidiaries to repay a debt 
Pelullo owed; and (3) defrauding Royale of approximately $500,000 
by diverting money for uses other than for the purposes of the 
loans.  Accordingly, the alleged number of schemes in Pelullo was 
larger than the one scheme alleged here.  And while the number of 
victims in Pelullo could be characterized as small, the nature of 
the unlawful activity had a different ring to it, because in 
Pelullo the alleged perpetrator was an officer in a public 
company and the main victims (American and Royale) were public 
entities.  Moreover, the alleged fraud was not confined to 
  
Royale's internal operations, but took place in the context of 
its normal external business operations.  Thus, even though the 
Estate relies on Pelullo, that case involved much more than a 
dispute between partners and does not support the Estate's 
position.  Pelullo nevertheless is instructive to illustrate the 
contrast between a real RICO case and the Tabas's dispute.  
 While I do not suggest that a plaintiff alleging a 
single fraudulent scheme injuring a single victim in the context 
of a private dispute never can maintain a RICO claim, it would be 
unusual for such a case to be covered by RICO, especially where 
the alleged predicate acts are mail fraud.  In reaching this 
conclusion, I am cognizant that "RICO's pattern requirement does 
not require the existence of more than one 'scheme,'" Marshall-
Silver, 894 F.2d at 596, and that the Supreme Court has declared 
that the RICO statute should be read broadly "to reach both 
'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises,"  Sedima, S.P.R.L. 
v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3286 (1985).  
Furthermore, I recognize that the Court has noted that civil RICO 
appears to be "evolving into something quite different from the 
original conception of its enactors," and that this problem is 
for Congress, not the courts, to correct.  Id. at 499-500, 105 
S.Ct. at 3287.  See also NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S.Ct. 798, 806 
(1994). 
 Yet our precedents clearly establish that Congress did 
not intend RICO to cover every garden-variety fraud.  See 
  
Marshall-Silver, 894 F.2d at 597; accord Midwest Grinding Co., 
976 F.2d at 1025 ("[I]t is equally evident that RICO has not 
federalized every state common-law cause of action available to 
remedy business deals gone sour.").  Rather, the Supreme Court, 
"by refocusing the pattern requirement on the sort of long-term 
criminal activity that carries some quantum of threat to 
society," Midwest Grinding Co., 976 F.2d at 1025, has attempted 
"to prevent RICO from becoming a surrogate for garden-variety 
fraud actions properly brought under state law," id, at 1022; see 
also Marshall-Silver, 894 F.2d at 596-97 (noting that continuity 
plays an important role in constraining operation of RICO statute 
to only those activities which threaten societal injury).  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has confined the scope of RICO by 
limiting the persons who can be liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S.Ct. 1163 (1993). 
 In my view, the majority's opinion inexorably will 
result in federalizing numerous internal business disputes in a 
way that Congress never could have intended.  The opinion as 
applied in this circuit will lead attorneys to repackage as RICO 
actions ordinary commercial controversies in which the parties 
have communicated by mail or wire.  Indeed, it seems obvious that 
the principles of this case could be applied to routine 
commercial disputes in many situations in which the parties have 
been in an ongoing relationship, e.g., partnerships, tenancies, 
employer-employee, service contracts, supply contracts, equipment 
  
rentals, brokerage accounts, and others as well.  A party in such 
a relationship, dissatisfied with the other party's performance, 
will be able to establish RICO jurisdiction by alleging fraud and 
pointing to the other party's numerous mailings in furtherance of 
its understanding of the terms of the relationship.  For the 
foregoing reasons, I dissent.  Chief Judge Sloviter,37 and Judges 
Hutchinson, Scirica, Cowen, and Nygaard38 join in this dissent. 
            
 
 
 
 
                     
    
37Judge Sloviter joins with the following statement.  
Although I do not agree with every detail of Judge Greenberg's 
dissent, I join it because it comes closest to expressing my 
frustration that the analytic litany that the courts must now 
conduct in civil RICO cases leads to a result, the federalization 
of garden variety fraud, that is directly contrary to Congress's 
expressed intent. 
    
38Judge Nygaard joins in the dissent, believing that the 
district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants.  He bases his conclusion that summary judgment was 
proper, however, upon plaintiffs' failure to show facts giving 
rise to mail fraud under RICO rather than upon a failure to 
establish a pattern of racketeering activity.  Under Judge 
Nygaard's analysis, the mailings here were, as in United States 
v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 94 S.Ct. 645 (1974), merely post-fraud 
means of transmitting matter from one place to another.  Judge 
Nygaard believes that inasmuch as the fraud "had reached 
fruition," at the time of the mailing, it cannot be said that the 
mailings in question were for the purpose of executing the 
scheme, as required by the statute.  Kann v. United States, 323 
U.S. 88, 65 S.Ct. 148 (1944).  Hence, it was not "an essential 
step" in the success of the fraud.  Schmuck v. United States, 489 
U.S. 705, 714, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1450 (1989). 
